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Foreword  
Dr. Josephat Stephen Itika 
For the past three decades Tanzania has embarked on a number of policy reforms 
and strategies to reduce poverty and promote economic growth. The most fun-
damental strategies taken started with the Civil Service Reform Programmes in 
the early 1990s, followed by Public Service Reform Programmes I and II and 
Local Government Reform Programmes I and II. These formed part of the foun-
dations of the development of policy objectives envisioned in the National Strat-
egy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), as developed from the mac-
ro policy ambitions founded under the Millennium Development Goals 2015 and 
Tanzania Vision 2025. The ultimate goal of these strategies has always been to 
achieve a high level of socio-economic transformation and growth by effective 
institutions of governance capable of meeting the needs of Tanzania as a middle-
income country by 2025. 
Although throughout the years a lot of groundwork has been done towards this 
goal, particularly in terms of creating an enabling environment for strong institu-
tions of governance through continuous human resource capacity development, 
there have been indications of dissatisfactions with the outcome of such initia-
tives. For example, the Key Result Area 6 of the Public Service Reform Phase II 
emphasized the importance, required interventions, and expected outcomes of 
leadership capacity development in the public service as part of strengthening 
public service delivery and accountability. Similarly, the Local Government Re-
form Programme II, which was devoted to decentralization through the devolu-
tion of powers, authority and responsibility from the central government to the 
lowest levels possible, has among others focused on capacity building in leader-
ship development, organization and human resource development. The underly-
ing philosophy has been to ensure full utilization of human capital potential. 
From the LGRP II perspective, strengthening leadership in local authorities 
must involve reviewing and clarifying the roles of different employees and build-
ing their capacity to lead others as a prerequisite to achieving the objectives of 
the National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction. The other area of ca-
pacity development is organisational and human resource development in Local 
 
 
ix 
Government Authorities (LGAs). The focus has been on building the capacity of 
technical and managerial staff in LGAs to set standards for staff and services in 
order to improve performance and ultimate service delivery.  
However, notwithstanding the possible improvements made up until now, the 
Annual Synthesis Report (2009/2010), which assessed the performance of Local 
Government Authorities as a precondition for their entitlement of Capacity 
Building Grants (CBGs), shows an increase in failure rates of performance tar-
gets. Data in the Capacity Utilization Report January-December 2008 for Capaci-
ty Building Grants shows that the main causes for failure center on leadership, 
organization and human resource management. These factors contributed to the 
late submission of quarterly reports to the Prime Ministers’ Office, Regional 
Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG), to unharmonized Capaci-
ty Building Grants, to the limited role of human resource officers in capacity 
building planning, and to an inadequate output/outcome/impact assessment. Sim-
ilarly, Training Needs Assessments conducted by Mzumbe University in 2008 
and 2009 show that heads of departments and sections have an inadequate ca-
pacity to manage staffing functions. For example, one of the objectives of the 
human resource management capacity-building component under LGRP I was to 
decentralize human resource management functions to heads of departments and 
sections while the human resource officers remain in advisory and support roles. 
This would have enhanced human resource management functions including re-
cruitment, training, performance appraisal and development of appropriate re-
ward systems. However, human resource structures in local authorities are still 
highly centralized. 
 
This book is a result of a joint project between the School of Public Administra-
tion and Management of Mzumbe University and the University of Groningen in 
the Netherlands under the generous support of the Dutch government through 
The Netherlands Organization for International Cooperation in Higher Education 
(Nuffic), which started in 2010. The general objective of the project was to build 
the university’s capacity to support the Tanzanian government in achieving the 
ambitions envisaged in decentralization by devolution to local authorities. 
Readers will note that the book is divided into four major themes. They are 
human resource management, public administration and leadership, institutional 
and organizational development and service delivery. As explained earlier, these 
four themes fit very well within the focus of Local Government Reform Pro-
gramme II: building capacity not only of those who are employed but also of stu-
dents who will be employed by both central and local government institutions. 
Capacity-building entails enabling current and future employees of local authori-
ties to identify and analyse problems, make rational choices, formulate solutions, 
 x 
and implement actions designed to achieve the set objectives based on the decen-
tralization by devolution framework. It means creating space for the strengthen-
ing of leadership, organization and management of human resources. Since peo-
ple receive public services through local authorities that employ more than 60% 
of the Tanzanian workforce, it is anticipated that, if effectively disseminated to 
all key stakeholders and internalized, knowledge in this book will make a signifi-
cant contribution to the quality of staff and institutional governance and will ul-
timately improve service delivery. 
I wish to encourage all students, particularly those who intend to work in the 
public sector, to read this book and indeed take a personal copy for reference be-
cause it unearths practical lessons based in a Tanzanian context that can hardly 
be obtained elsewhere. Those who are already working in the public sector and 
particularly in local authorities will also find it very insightful and refreshing, 
inciting desire to do things better for the good of our people and institutions. 
Let me take this opportunity to express my heart-felt appreciation for a job 
very well done. As we all know, writing a book is a serious undertaking that re-
quires the passion and commitment of all team members at all times. Special 
thanks should go to the Dutch Government through Nuffic for financing the pro-
ject and to Professor Dr. Ko de Ridder and Dr. Albertjan Tollanaar from the Uni-
versity of Groningen and Dr. Stella Kinemo from Mzumbe University for steer-
ing the wheel together. Prof. Dr. Ben Emans from Hanze University, Dr. Rudie 
Hulst and Dr. Bas van Gool from VU University have been very instrumental in 
supporting the team with capacity building for research and writing. Thank you 
very much. Finally, last but not least I wish to thank the stream leaders, research-
ers, reviewers, publisher and support staff from all partner institutions for making 
the dream of producing this book a reality.  
 
Dr. Josephat Stephen Itika 
Professor of Management and Acting Vice Chancellor 
Mzumbe University 
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African public administration at work 
Ko de Ridder, Ben Emans, Rudie Hulst & Albertjan Tollenaar 
Introduction 
Good public administration is a core requirement for development, as all the lit-
erature agrees. The more difficult question is: what constitutes good public ad-
ministration? What kind of public governance enhances development in the third 
world, more specifically in Africa and even more specifically in Tanzania? There 
is a temptation to borrow from near and far neighbours. Donor countries and 
NGO’s offer their own versions of good public administration, based on their 
own experiences. Text books on different specialized topics in public administra-
tion find their way from the developed into the developing countries. Of course 
there is nothing wrong with learning from the experiences elsewhere, both good 
and bad. But there is a catch. Administrative expertise is unlike physical technol-
ogy in the sense that it cannot just be implemented and applied anywhere, with-
out consideration for a societal context. Mobile phone technology for instance 
works the same, whether it is utilized in The Netherlands or in Tanzania. Public 
administration on the other hand is very much a cultural phenomenon, embedded 
in the social fabric of the society it serves. The implementation of administrative 
good practices from elsewhere requires that they are adapted and geared to the 
specifics of the recipient country. In the end it is the social and public environ-
ment that determines the effectiveness of such transplants. Beyond that, a nation-
al system of public administration will have to innovate and improve also by de-
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veloping its own indigenous ways and means for shaping and operating public 
institutions.  
This state of affairs offers quite a challenge for academic public administra-
tion, in particular for teaching public administration and training future public 
officials. In the average African country, and certainly also in Tanzania, public 
administration educational programs primarily make use of text books from 
abroad, notably from Western countries. Too often it is taken for granted that 
notions, concepts and tools that do fit the administrative culture of origin are 
straightforwardly applicable on the receiving end as well. Thus students of public 
administration may end up with a perception of the subject that does not fit the 
administrative realities in their own country. To put it bluntly: there is a risk that 
a student of public administration in Africa might very well gain a better under-
standing of the local government system in Great Britain or the USA than in 
Tanzania or Nigeria. The teaching and studying of public administration in Afri-
ca should be about African public administration. The challenge then is to extract 
the core insights from public administration scholarship around the world and 
make them applicable to gain a better understanding of indigenous governance 
issues.  
This book is an attempt to do just that. Actually, it is the second attempt. Four 
years ago, in 2011, staff members of the Mzumbe School of Public Administra-
tion and Management (SoPAM), in cooperation with scholars from the Universi-
ty of Groningen, published a book under the title: Theories and Stories (Itika, De 
Ridder & Tollenaar 2011). That book discussed a number of core concepts of the 
public administration discourse, connected with case stories derived from the 
Tanzanian administrative reality. The present volume is building on that experi-
ence. The cases in Theories and Stories were not originally written to test a con-
cept or an administrative approach in the Tanzanian public realm. They were se-
lected because they offered a good illustration of how a general concept could be 
applied for a specific Tanzanian situation. The present book is based on original 
studies, for which a theoretical approach or notion was the starting point. In fact, 
the activities leading up to the writing of the papers in this book were a trajectory 
of consecutive steps, starting with case study research and ending up with casting 
original case study material into the mould of a chapter in a text book.  
In the remainder of this first chapter we will discuss the different steps that 
lead up to this book in some more detail. 
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From case research to educational case 
Cases selection: administrative cases in a DbyD environment. 
The overarching theme of this project is Decentralization by Devolution. In Tan-
zania, DbyD is a huge transformation program that has been developed and im-
plemented over the last 15 years. Development has been sluggish, implementa-
tion was slow and fragmented and results up to now are ambivalent. This is not 
unusual, as far as public administration reform programs all over the world go. 
Beyond that, decentralization is a public administration concept with many for-
eign roots and a variety of interpretations. The Tanzanian variety as it resulted 
from these many years of development and implementation has not been char-
tered in detail yet. The intention of the project was to take stock of DbyD 
achievements in four selected areas, and make an inventory of the way decentral-
ized institutions actually work.  
The approach chosen required the selection of four specific PA areas in which 
DbyD could effectively be studied. The areas selected are four current issues in 
Tanzanian public administration that are within the areas of expertise of the staff 
of the School of Public Administration and Management of Mzumbe University. 
SoPAM wishes to play a leading role in these specific areas, both academically 
and in terms of transferring knowledge to the practitioners of public administra-
tion. For that reason financial issues were left out. The project set out with the 
following four topics: 1) public administration and leadership, 2) organizational 
and institutional development, 3) human resource management and 4) service 
delivery management. For each of these topics, researchable cases had to be cho-
sen. For the first topic, the staff team responsible picked ‘leadership at the village 
level’ as the specific subject for a number of case studies. According to all policy 
documents, ‘leadership’ is considered as a crucial factor for the success of the 
DbyD policy. While in a complementary PhD study the focus is on leadership at 
the district level, the village level was considered appropriate for case studies in 
the framework of this project.  
For the second topic, organizational and institutional development, the team 
zoomed in on one institutional issue, politico-administrative relations at the dis-
trict level. The Tanzanian district, the core of local government, is still in a state 
of flux. Decision making at the district level can only be done well if politicians 
and bureaucrats have established some sort of rapport. The team set out to map 
the politico-administrative landscape at the district level, doing case studies in 
two districts.  
The third topic, human resource management, was transformed into a more 
specific object of research: the relationship between DbyD and HRM at the dis-
trict level. Many HRM decisions are still made centrally, in the ministry of local 
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government. Districts do have some leeway however, in a number of areas. The 
team wanted to know what room the district administration has to conduct its 
own human resource management and how that room is being used.  
The team responsible for the fourth topic, service delivery management, 
zoomed in on twee two rather differing cases, of which one made it to this vol-
ume. The first case was in the policy area of health management, the second was 
about (local) government involvement in the processing of crops, more particu-
larly cashew nut crops. In the management of crop processing many conflicting 
interests are involved and government tends to be involved in order to reconcile 
these interests in an even-handed way, creating a fair deal for all concerned. The 
case of the cashew nut crops seemed particularly promising because fairly recent-
ly new institutions at the district level had been put in place for the fair admin-
istration of crop handling. 
 
Issues with case studies 
Case study research is a particularly completed approach to social research. It has 
the advantage that the social reality under study can be presented in rich detail, as 
opposed to quantitative strategies that are far more reductionist in nature. A dis-
advantage is that there are no clear cut cook book like recipes available that in-
form the methodology to be applied. There are good handbooks however that 
offer lots of useful pointers and directives. For the methodology applied in this 
project, the research teams used Yin’s book on case study research (Yin 2013). 
Still, all kinds of methodological decisions had to be made. Three methodologi-
cal issues are highlighted here: the transformation of theories, the accessibility of 
data sources and the problems of data processing. 
 
Theories 
Data collection in a case study needs to be focused. From the bewildering variety 
in social reality that information has to be extracted that is required for answering 
the research question. Theory is the tool to reduce the complexity and facilitate 
the creation of some order in the chaos of reality. Good theories help to focus on 
what is important for understanding and not to be distracted by triviality. Good 
theories expose how different phenomena relate to each other. Good theories, in 
short, are an indispensable tool for any description or analysis of administrative 
reality. Still, theories are abstractions – a presentation of reality but certainly not 
reality itself. There is a gap to be bridged between the abstract ideas contained in 
the theory and the concrete phenomena of everyday administrative life. Moreo-
ver, the challenge in this particular research was to bridge the gap between theo-
ries based on experiences in the Western World and the realities of Tanzanian 
public administration. More precisely, the challenge was to select from the vast 
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literature those theoretical notions that might fit the research questions concern-
ing the four topics outlined in the previous section. 
For the research into leadership of officials at the local level, the research 
team drew upon the established literature on leadership styles and applied the 
dichotomy of transactional and transformational leadership to qualify the behav-
iour of the local leaders. The charge here was to find out whether the tools for 
observation as developed for leadership behaviour in western urbanized societies 
would work in the context of Tanzanian villages. The team that had set out to 
analyse the issue of the relationship between the counsellors and the bureaucrats 
at the district level, could fall back on a vast literature from all over the world. 
They came up with a model that highlights three distinct forms in which politico-
administrative relations may manifest themselves, from which they derived a set 
of indicators to observe the real world. Beyond that, they became interested in 
the subjective perceptions politicians and administrators entertained about each 
other. The HRM team took its lead from both the literature on decentralization 
and on personnel management, in order to create a frame work in which district 
HRM practices could be captured as a function of central-local relations. For the 
analysis of the cashew nut crop processing, the research team selected the theo-
retical notion of coproduction to make sense of both the institutional arrange-
ments and the actual practices in the field. 
 
Access 
Data collection for case research in administrative practices requires adequate 
access into administrative institutions and processes, for observation, for the 
analysis of documents and for conversations with the persons involved. Adminis-
trative organizations greatly vary in the accessibility for research. In Tanzania, 
the problems involved in gaining access are burgeoned by the long distances, the 
difficult roads and the complex communications. The research teams succeeded 
in tackling the problems involved by using their personal networks in the admin-
istrative system of Tanzania. All staff members involved are university teachers, 
and many if not most of their former students found their way into the practice of 
public administration. Personal networks proved a valuable resource for the 
opening up the system for data mining.  
 
Data processing 
The data retrieved from the field still formed unorganized clusters of information 
that required a thorough analysis in order to answers the research questions. In 
order to do so, the theoretical notions that guided the research, were transformed 
into sets of trays, each representing a variable. Each tray then was filled with the 
data that matched the variable. This procedure provided the researchers with an 
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ordered set of data from which the administrative processes and institutions un-
der scrutiny could be described and analysed. The outcome of the data processing 
was laid down in a case study report for each of the four research projects 
(Kinemo et al. 2015, Mafuru et al. 2015, Mfaume & Kunkuta 2015, Mwakasan-
gula et al. 2015). 
 
Transforming cases research into educational cases  
A research report is not the same as an educational case. It rather takes quite a 
transformation to derive an educational case from the material contained in the 
research report. An educational case is a story. The story has a limited time frame 
and is concerned with just one incident, one decision or one organization. Still, 
the educational case is rich in detail. It comes as close to making a snapshot of 
administrative reality as possible. What makes a good educational case? First of 
all it has to be based on good research: the rendering of the facts has to be relia-
ble. Furthermore, the story needs to be told systematically. Rich detail is fine, but 
all detail needs to be functional for getting the meaning of the story across. It has 
to be clear what the intention of the case is: what theoretical notion it is supposed 
to illustrate; what type of analyse it is intended to evoke, etc.  
 
A good educational case has at least three utilities in the class room.  
1. Course material often is primarily theoretical; it defines, categorizes, enu-
merates, explains. Educational cases offer the real life story that not just 
shows or illuminates the theoretical expositions. Particularly for that large 
slice of the student body that has not been actively out in the field educa-
tional cases offer indispensable glimpses of the administrative reality that 
the text books are explaining.  
2. Educational cases offer illustrative material for understanding concepts, 
theories, process models etc. Theories are lenses, that make it possible to 
view reality in a certain way, to analyze and to explain. Educational cases 
present opportunities for the student of public administration to practice the 
use of such analytical tools.  
3. Educational cases are the instrument of choice for interactive teaching. Cas-
es present topics for class room exercises. Answering questions about how 
incidents in the case could occur or about factors that may or may not be 
important for explaining what happened, will sharpen the analytical skills 
of the student of public administration. Furthermore, case material can be 
questioned in philosophical and ethical terms, engender class room debate 
about what constitutes good governance in this case and in general.  
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The cases in this volume are written by public administration scholars from Tan-
zania. They are all teaching courses in public administration and public manage-
ment. Most of them have lots of experience with the realities of development 
administration and governance, as a consultant, a researcher or a civil servant. 
They bring African public administration into the class room. 
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2 
Decentralization of Human  
Resource Management in  
Tanzanian governmental  
organizations 
Stella Kinemo, Emmanuel Ndikumana, Hamisi Kiyabo, Venance Shillingi, 
Moses Kwayu & Peter Andrea 
Introduction 
In 1999 The Tanzanian government launched the Local Government Reform 
Program I (LGRP I), the aim of which was first and foremost decentralization. 
The ambition underlying it was, and still is, to improve local administrations by 
transferring discretionary power to district and urban authorities with regards to 
several issues, including administration (PMO-RALG 2009). Human Resource 
Management (HRM) stands out as an area that should particularly be affected by 
the program. HRM, the management of people in an organization, encompasses 
managerial practices such as the recruitment, selection, rewarding, promotion, 
training and development of employees (for the ins and outs of these practices in 
the African context, see Itika 2011). The enhancement of the HRM autonomy of 
local (district/urban) authorities would be highly beneficial, according to the spir-
it of LGRP I. The HRM in local government organizations would benefit from it, 
and eventually the overall performance of those organizations would be in-
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creased. In the present chapter this particular development - the decentralization 
of governmental HRM - is critically examined. More specifically, two issues are 
identified and discussed. The first one is the actual degree of HRM decentraliza-
tion in the Tanzanian Local Government Authorities (LGAs) of today. As will be 
seen, the state of affairs is still characterized by centralization rather than decen-
tralization, in spite of the initial LGRP ambitions. The second issue to be dis-
cussed is the whole of the outcomes, both positive and negative, that may be ex-
pected to result from HRM decentralization. An analysis of these outcomes may 
help to answer the question of which HR functions are best performed by a de-
centralized governmental structure and which are best performed by a centralized 
structure. The underlying assumption is the commonly held view that decentrali-
zation has its advantages as well as disadvantages (Pollit & Bouckaert 2000; 
Shafritz et al. 2001; Tessema et al. 2009). 
In the first section of the chapter the legislation that sets the stage for HRM 
decentralization is outlined. As is the case in the chapter as a whole, the concept 
of HRM-decentralization is split up into the decentralization of 1) employee se-
lection & retention, 2) employee rewarding, and 3) employee training & devel-
opment. These three practices together are considered to cover, by and large, the 
whole range of crucial HRM responsibilities. The second section, which is based 
on what is known from academic literature, gives an analysis of the advantages 
and disadvantages of the decentralization of HRM practices. In the third section 
the subject matter of the previous sections is examined from the perspective of 
people for whom the HRM of local authorities forms part of their daily work. It 
recounts the experiences of civil servants (including HR managers) and council 
members in two LGAs. Those experiences add authenticity to statements made in 
the preceding sections. In the fourth and final section, the contents of the other 
sections are integrated into the conclusions that can be drawn. 
Actual degree of HRM decentralization: the rules 
The rights and responsibilities of Local Government Authorities are demarcated 
in a number of legislative texts (see Table 2.1). The human resource management 
of Local Government Authorities is enacted within the setting created by this 
body of legislation. The consequences for the decentralization of 1) recruitment 
& selection, 2) rewarding, and 3) training & development are outlined in the fol-
lowing. 
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Table 2.1  Legislative texts demarcating rights and responsibilities of Tanzanian LGAs 
Mainland legislation  Government (Urban Authorities) Act 1982 
 Local Government Finance Act 1982 
 Urban Authorities (Rating) Act 1983 
 Regional Administration Act 1997 
 Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 199910 
 Amendments to these laws that formed part of the Local Govern-
ment Reform Program, from 1999 
Zanzibar legislation  Zanzibar Municipal Council Act 1995 
 District and Town Councils Act 1995 
 
 
Recruitment & selection 
Generally speaking, the procedures for recruitment and selection in Local Gov-
ernment Authorities are predominantly centralized (controlled by the Central 
Government). This is especially the case regarding the recruitment and selection 
of civil servants in managerial positions. These are firstly the District Executive 
Director (in District Authorities) and the Town/Municipal/City Director (in Ur-
ban Authorities), and secondly the Heads of Departments. Typical departments 
headed by the latter are, for example, those for education and culture, trade and 
economic affairs, health and social welfare, planning and finance, and personnel 
and administration. The appointment of those civil servants is straightforwardly a 
matter of centralization. The president directly appoints city council directors 
whereas the minister responsible for local governments appoints directors of 
town, municipal, and district councils as well as the heads of departments all over 
the country. The actual recruitment work is done by a central government agency 
called the Public Service Recruitment Secretariat (PSRS) which was established 
in accordance with Section No. 29 (1) of the Public Service (Amendment) Act, 
No. 18 of 2007. The Act mandates the Secretariat to conduct the recruitment pro-
cesses of public servants within the public service. Recruitment and selection 
procedures are furthermore governed by a number of statutes including the Pub-
lic Service Act No.8 of 2002 as amended by Act No.18 of 2007, Public Service 
Regulations 2003, Public Service Scheme 2003, as well as employment guide-
lines and establishment circulars. 
In the procedures for the recruitment and selection of employees other than di-
rectors and heads of departments the local authorities themselves play a role. 
That is not to say, however, that they are as a rule entitled to make appointment 
decisions. On the contrary, it is still the central government who decides in many 
instances. In the case of the appointment of teachers, for instance, the Ministry of 
Education and Vocational Training is still responsible for the whole recruitment 
and selection process. The statutes that apply to the appointments of directors and 
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heads of departments (see above) apply furthermore no less to the appointments 
of other employees. The local authorities are, however, involved in decisions re-
garding selection and recruitment in that they are the ones who identify vacant 
posts and propose budgets for fulfilling those posts. Overall, however, the state 
of affairs can evidently not be characterized as being decentralized. An appropri-
ate qualification would be, say, ‘95% centralization’. Only in the recruitment of 
lower cadre temporary employees have the local authorities some autonomy. 
 
Rewarding 
As is the case with recruitment and selection, the rewarding of civil servants of 
Local Government Authorities is regulated in a mainly centralistic way. To begin 
with, the local authorities have no say in the design of pay systems (salary scales, 
salary levels, retirement benefits schemes) for their employees. According to the 
Public Service Pay and Incentive Policy 2010, it is the role of the (central) gov-
ernment to develop a total reward system in the public service (which includes 
local governments). A number of central government agencies are involved in 
this process, including the President’s Office for Public Service Management, the 
Prime Minister’s Office for Regional Administration and Local Government, and 
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. The latter ensures that public ser-
vice pay is systematically enhanced in an affordable and sustainable manner. In 
sum, the making of pay systems for civil servants in Local Government Authori-
ties is a matter of unqualified centralistic decision making. That is not to say that 
the practice of rewarding is entirely centralized, because this practice involves 
more than making pay systems. It also involves the application of those systems. 
The application of pay systems includes, to begin with, decision-making re-
garding salary increases for employees. According to the Standing Orders of 
2009 those decisions are at the discretion of the central government. Setting aside 
prescribed annual increments for which public servant are eligible, no increase in 
salary may be authorized without the explicit approval of the Permanent Secre-
tary (Establishments). The local authorities only play a role in the first phase of 
the decision-making process. They submit salary increase proposals upon the 
recommendation of employee supervisors. This part of the reward practice can 
thus be qualified as moderately decentralized. 
Applying pay systems also includes granting specific incentives and benefits, 
supplementary to an employee’s salary. Specific examples are compensations for 
housing or transportation costs and incidental bonuses. This part of the practice 
of rewarding is regulated in the same way as the salary increase part: local au-
thorities apply for the grants and the central government decides to award them 
and provides the budgets. Only as regards the awarding of bonuses in cash, the 
12  
 
local authorities are to a certain extent autonomous. They are free to give those 
bonuses to selected employees, paying them from their own budgets. 
With regard to the payment of temporary lower cadre personnel the local au-
thorities do have some freedom, without the restrictions implied by the regula-
tions outlined above. Given these regulations, however, the HRM practice of re-
warding local government employees has to be characterized as a generally cen-
tralized arrangement overall. The local authorities are expected to perform the 
role of executors rather than initiators of payment policies. 
 
Training & development 
Compared to recruitment & selection and rewarding, training & development of 
local government employees is less strictly regulated and, as a consequence, 
more subject to decentralized decision-making. The ultimate goals of this HRM 
practice are listed in certain documents of the central government, such as the 
Training Strategy for LGAs 2010. Among those goals are the enhancement of 
competences that are needed for the functioning of personnel and the functioning 
of the organization as a whole, and an equal access to training opportunities for 
staff of all grade levels. By specifying objectives of training and development, 
the central government thus cements the outlines of the way that HRM practice 
has to be enacted. Viewed from that perspective, the arrangement can be called 
centralistic. The translation of the instructions into actual measures, however, is a 
responsibility of the local authorities themselves. With that, a truly decentralistic 
element is added to the arrangement. As long as their plans for training and de-
velopment can be shown to fit in with the guidelines of the central government, 
the local authorities as a rule receive the budgets needed to implement those 
plans.  
 
Advantages and disadvantages of HRM decentralization 
The urge to decentralize governmental HRM, as it is subsumed in the Local 
Government Reform Program I (PMO-RALG 2009), is not a uniquely Tanzanian 
phenomenon. It has actually emerged globally in the past three decades as an el-
ement of generic public sector reforms (Tessema et al. 2009; Cayer 2004, 
Kearney 2003, World Bank 1999; Berman et al. 2001; Shafritz et al. 2001). One 
of the causes of this trend is unmistakably the fact that, especially in developing 
countries, the organizational arrangement of civil service HR departments tended 
to be overly and impractically centralized (Tessema 2005; Bennell 1994; Heady 
1996). Amalgams of hierarchical and centralized arrangements based on rigid 
notions of legal authority and rationality produced the problems that are typical 
of large bureaucratic structures. Another cause may be found in the prevailing 
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contemporary political ideology with its reliance upon the beneficence of free 
market forces (Legge 1995). This ideology tends to embrace a decentralized gov-
ernmental structure as the preferred vehicle for optimizing everything, including 
HRM functions. Causes like these can be said to explain the trend toward HRM 
decentralization but that is not to say, of course, that they also justify it. For the 
latter, an overview of the factual pros and cons of HRM decentralization is re-
quired. In the present section of this chapter such an overview is unfolded. Elabo-
rating on views expounded in the literature, the advantages and disadvantages of 
decentralization of the HRM practices of recruitment and selection, rewarding, 
and development and training are outlined. Firstly, a couple of points will be 
made about the advantages and disadvantages of decentralization in general. 
Thereafter, the focus shifts to HRM decentralization. 
The key argument for the decentralization of government systems in general is 
that local rather than central authorities are best equipped for making decisions 
about local affairs, as they have more knowledge of local circumstances that have 
to be taken into account (Hope 2001). Policies are assumed to become more flex-
ible, innovative, responsive, and tailor-made through decentralization (Berman et 
al. 2001; Cayer 2004, Hays & Kearney 2001). Additionally, the policy-making 
process is expected to become more efficient, that is, less time- and resource- 
consuming due to shortened communication lines between decision-makers and 
involved parties (Hope 2001). There is also a downside to this model: an undeni-
able disadvantage of decentralized, compared to centralized, forms of policy 
making is that outside the centre it may be hard to hire and keep the expertise 
needed for high-quality decision making. It was actually, according to Wood 
(2000: 90), the lack of technical capacities on the part of local authorities that 
initially gave rise to the centralization of public services. All in all, the picture 
that arises is thus a mixed one, showing advantages as well as disadvantages of 
decentralized forms of government. 
 A number of studies focus on the HRM part of the picture. Berman, Bowman, 
West & Van Wart (2001) conclude that the flexibility of recruitment and selec-
tion operations benefits from decentralization conditions: non-standard solutions 
for finding new employees are more easily found if those who are responsible for 
the acquisition of personnel are familiar with situational particularities. A similar 
flexibility-through-decentralization principle applies, according to Berman et al. 
(2001) and Lavigna & Hays (2004), to the HRM tasks following recruitment and 
selection, that is, the tasks to keep, maintain, and develop employees once they 
are employed. The HRM practices of rewarding and training and development 
are the vehicles used to that end. Non-standard ways for rewarding, motivating, 
and supporting employees are claimed to be most easily detected and applied 
under decentralized conditions, where the responsible HRM officers are in close 
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contact with the involved workers. Other authors such as Cayer (2004), Hays and 
Kearney (2001), Coggburn (2005), and Selden et al. (2001), arrive at similar 
conclusions. Next to the enhanced flexibility, these authors also stress that a 
higher degree of responsiveness of HRM policies is made possible by decentrali-
zation. For instance, the probability that selection decisions match job require-
ments characteristic of the local situation is highest when the involved selection 
officer has firsthand knowledge of that situation. Local HR managers know how 
to customize practices to meet local HR needs. 
Tessema et al. (2009), while being mainly in favour of HRM decentralization, 
also have an eye for its disadvantages. In their view, a central agency is needed to 
make sure that Human Resource Management performances across local and re-
gional units all match up to fixed standards. This signifies the strategic role of the 
central government of setting standards and accordingly monitoring and evaluat-
ing the work that is done in the field. In a sense, this can be considered as another 
plea for HRM-decentralization, because central agencies will be more able to 
fulfil their strategic role adequately when they are freed from the responsibilities 
of daily HRM operations that are outside their own setting (Quah 2007; Cheema 
2005; Jones 2001). For HR managers in the involved local and regional units 
those responsibilities are less burdensome. 
In Tables 2.2-2.4 the above situation is translated into lists of tangible ad-
vantages and disadvantages of HRM-decentralization that are expected to be 
manifest in the daily operations of local government organizations (decentraliza-
tion disadvantages being phrased as centralization advantages). This is done sep-
arately for the three HRM-practices of recruitment & selection, rewarding and 
training & development. For reasons of analytical clarity the tables are set up 
three-dimensionally: a distinction is made between advantages in terms of HRM-
effectiveness, HRM-efficiency and HRM-fairness, respectively. The meaning of 
these terms are clarified below, beginning with HRM-effectiveness, along with a 
discussion of the table contents. 
 
HRM-decentralization and HRM-effectiveness 
As its name implies, Human Resource Management has to take care of ‘human 
resources’, that is: of employees. More specifically, the task of HRM can be de-
fined as realizing and maintaining appropriate levels of the availability, the com-
petency, the motivation, and the fitness of employees (Emans 2010). Discussing 
the advantages and disadvantages of HRM decentralization means above all ad-
dressing to what degree decentralization helps to perform that task effectively. 
That is what is called here HRM-effectiveness. Defined this way, HRM-
effectiveness tends to be disappointingly low in developing countries, as is re-
vealed by studies about the situation in those countries. The people recruited are 
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not always the best possible candidates (Cohen & Wheeler 1997), employed 
people are under-utilized (World Bank 1999), good performance is not promoted 
(Cohen & Wheeler 1997), and well-performing employees are badly retained 
(Budhwar & Debrah 2001; Kiggundu 1989). The question is whether HRM de-
centralization may help to improve this state of affairs. 
Recruitment and selection practices are effective to the degree that the best 
possible people are recruited and selected in view of the organization’s needs. As 
is articulated in Table 2.2, decentralized practices seem to be more advantageous 
in this respect than centralized ones, mainly due to the many opportunities avail-
able for making decisions that are in accordance with local circumstances and 
locally experienced organization needs. Candidates who are posted from central 
recruitment may lack the experience and commitment needed for work in periph-
eral and other regions, simply due to the fact that central recruiters are unfamiliar 
with the circumstances in those regions. On the other hand, in centralized prac-
tices attention is likely to be paid to other essential needs, that is, organization-
overarching (national) needs. A further advantage of centralized practices, com-
pared to decentralized ones, is that they tend to be manned by agents with better 
skills who can rely on a broader range of resources. Those agents, in contrast to 
their de-central colleagues, are well-equipped not only for the design of recruit-
ment and selection methods but also for complex operations such as, for instance, 
the recruitment of teachers and other professionals countrywide. Compared to 
agents in remote areas they are obviously in a better position to do that job effec-
tively. Without some form of centralization, the even distribution of employees 
to every corner of the country is hard to realize. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn as to the practice of rewarding (see Table 
2.3). The objectives of this specific practice, as it is worded in the Public Service 
Pay and Incentive Policy (2010), is to attract the right people for employment 
and to compensate employees appropriately. Appropriately means firstly in ac-
cordance with the work that is done and secondly in such a way that the involved 
employees become maximally motivated to perform well and to remain in the 
organization. 
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Table 2.2 Three-dimensional appraisal of (de)centralization of HRM in local 
government organizations: the practice of recruitment & selection
Dimension Advantages of decentralization 
(Pointing to disadvantages of cen-
tralization)  
Advantages of centralization 
(Pointing to disadvantages of de-
centralization) 
HRM-effectiveness  Optimal fit between qualifica-
tions of selected employees and 
organization-specific job re-
quirements (job contents, job 
complexity) 
 Optimal fit between attributes of 
selected employees and the daily 
work context, including fellow 
colleagues 
 Flexibility: enrichment and im-
provement of standard recruit-
ment procedures through making 
use of local opportunities 
 Procedural speed: vacant posi-
tions are timely filled because 
decisions do not need to wait for 
authorization by an external (cen-
tral) agency 
 Procedural speed: vacant posi-
tions are timely filled because re-
quired adjustments of activities 
performed by involved actors can 
be implemented immediately 
 Optimal fit between qualifica-
tions of selected employees and 
nationwide adopted standards of 
skills and competences of civil 
servants 
 Availability of highly skilled 
staff to perform complex tasks 
such as the design of recruitment 
and selection systems 
 Availability of resources needed 
for complex operations, such as 
nationwide recruitment 
 Preservation of the quality of 
recruitment and selection opera-
tions nationwide by means of 
monitoring and controlling de-
vices to be uniformly applied 
throughout the country 
HRM-efficiency  Low process costs: the compara-
tively simple procedures, with 
involved actors working in one 
organization, demand (compara-
tively) little time and resources 
(‘not much red tape’) 
 Economy of scale: staff needed 
for the design of recruitment and 
selection systems are concentrat-
ed in one (central) place; systems 
do not need to be invented by 
each single de-central unit 
HRM-fairness  No special merits  Nepotism and tribalism barrier: 
decision-making by central agen-
cies (which are not involved in 
local alliances) tends to be unaf-
fected by improper feelings of 
loyalty towards specific (catego-
ries of) people 
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Local agents, due to the fine-tuning possibilities they have, are in a good position 
for achieving these objectives. Central agents, on the other hand, are indispensa-
ble for creating the basic conditions for the latter, due to the resources they have 
for maintaining the rewarding machinery, among other things. 
 
 
Table 2.3 Three-dimensional appraisal of (de)centralization of HRM in local 
government organizations: the practice of rewarding 
Dimension Advantages of decentralization 
(Pointing to disadvantages of cen-
tralization)  
Advantages of centralization 
(Pointing to disadvantages of de-
centralization) 
HRM-effectiveness  Adaptability of reward levels to 
locally specific requirements re-
garding the motivation and reten-
tion of employee categories 
 Adaptability of reward levels to 
the unique performance levels of 
individual employees 
 Adaptability of reward levels to 
specific needs of (categories of) 
employees 
 Flexibility through the incorpora-
tion of local specificities in nego-
tiations regarding reward levels 
and related employee rights 
 Adaptability of reward levels to 
norms and intentions inherent in 
the country’s policies for build-
ing workforces in governmental 
organizations 
 Availability of highly skilled 
staff for designing and applying 
reward systems  
 Preservation of the quality of 
rewarding practices nationwide 
by means of monitoring and con-
trolling devices that are uniform-
ly applied throughout the country 
HRM-efficiency  Low process costs: the compara-
tively simple procedures (the in-
volved actors working in one and 
the same organization) demand 
(comparatively) little time and 
resources 
 Economy of scale: staff needed 
for the design of reward systems 
is concentrated in one (central) 
place; systems do not need to be 
redesigned by each single de-
central unit 
HRM-fairness  Fine-tuning opportunities, result-
ing from being able to pay atten-
tion to delicate and/or more or 
less concealed circumstances that 
justify certain reward measures 
for individual employees 
 Equal treatment of employees 
nationwide 
 Nepotism and tribalism barrier: 
decision-making by central agen-
cies (which are not involved in 
local alliances) tends to be unaf-
fected by improper feelings of 
loyalty towards specific (catego-
ries of) employees 
 
 
In regards to the practice of training and development, conclusions are not alto-
gether different: decentralization has enormous merits, although centralization 
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has certain merits as well (see Table 2.4). An instructive document on this sub-
ject is the Training Strategy for LGAs (2010), which contains a list of drawbacks 
to the way the training and development practice tends to be enacted.  
 
 
Table 2.4 Three-dimensional appraisal of (de)centralization of HRM in local 
government organizations: the practice of training & development 
Dimension Advantages of decentralization 
(Pointing to disadvantages of cen-
tralization)  
Advantages of centralization 
(Pointing to disadvantages of de-
centralization) 
HRM-effectiveness  Adaptability of training programs 
to the organization’s need for 
employee competences, derived 
from the organization’s own 
long-term policy making and per-
sonnel planning  
 Adaptability of training programs 
to the specific ambitions and pos-
sibilities of individual employees 
 Room for the development of 
tailor-made on-the-job training 
programs for employees 
 Adaptability of training and 
development policies to the na-
tion’s ambition regarding capaci-
ty building in governmental or-
ganizations 
 Availability of highly skilled 
specialists for managing the se-
lection of programs for training 
and development and for moni-
toring the quality of training pro-
viders 
 Preservation of the quality of 
training and development prac-
tices nationwide by means of 
monitoring and controlling de-
vices that are uniformly applied 
throughout the country 
HRM-efficiency  Low process costs: the compara-
tively simple procedures for the 
allocation of training and devel-
opment opportunities (the in-
volved actors working in one and 
the same organization), demand 
(comparatively) little time and 
resources 
 Economy of scale: staff needed 
for finding appropriate training 
and development programs, ne-
gotiating with the providers of 
those programs, and monitoring 
the quality of provided programs 
are concentrated in one (central) 
place 
HRM-fairness  Fine-tuning opportunities, result-
ing from being able to pay atten-
tion to delicate and/or more or 
less concealed circumstances that 
justify certain training & devel-
opment investments for individu-
al employees 
 Equal treatment of employees 
nationwide 
 Nepotism and tribalism barrier: 
decision-making by central agen-
cies (which are not involved in 
local alliances) tends to be unaf-
fected by improper feelings of 
loyalty towards specific (catego-
ries of) employees 
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Three drawbacks in this list can be viewed as (unintended) results of the central-
ized nature of involved practices. In that sense, the document can be said to make 
a case for decentralization. Firstly, the authors of the document observe in some 
LGAs an over-emphasis on training activities linked to certificates and academic 
degrees at the expense of programs that focus on skills needed by employees in 
their daily work. An intensified involvement of local decision-makers might im-
prove this situation. Through this, skills needed locally would come into view 
more easily. Secondly, existing capacity-building plans often fail to be based, 
according to the document, on organization-specific assessments of the training 
needs of employees. Local agents, compared to their central counterparts, are 
obviously in a better position to execute, understand, and use training needs as-
sessments. Thirdly, there appears to be an overwhelming focus on a traditional 
classroom setup for training programs, far removed from the real-life profession-
al environment. Only local agents are sufficiently familiar with the employees’ 
work environment in order to be able to build training devices into that environ-
ment (training-on-the-job programs, as an alternative to class-room courses). In 
reducing the likelihood of these types of drawbacks, decentralization can thus be 
said to be indispensable for the promotion of training and development effective-
ness, defined in the document as building a capacity to deliver an improvement 
in service. 
The other side of the argument is that roles played by central government 
agencies are indispensable as well. Agents operating de-centrally are simply una-
ble to do much of their work without the instruction, support, and advice of cen-
tral agencies. For instance, the Training Strategy for LGAs document points to 
the importance of monitoring the quality of training providers. That is clearly an 
overarching LGA job, and is not suited for decentralization. Furthermore, train-
ing and development is a business in a complicated market of supply and de-
mand. For navigating the market, that is, for finding the best training services for 
their employees, local governments will always be dependent on the expertise of 
specialists of the central government. 
 
HRM decentralization and HRM efficiency 
Practices are called efficient when desired results are achieved using a minimum 
amount of time and resources. This is another issue to note when weighing the 
pros and cons of HRM decentralization. One way to secure efficiency is to pre-
vent complex processes from being split up into separate parts, with each part 
being managed by a separate actor. In an ideal situation a whole process is in the 
hand of one single actor. In that situation no time and money needs to be spend 
on inter-actor coordination. The technical term ‘low process costs’ applies to this. 
With regards to HRM in governmental organizations this is clearly a pro-
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decentralization argument: the more tasks and responsibilities are concentrated 
within the local authorities, the less need there is of coordination of work be-
tween the central and de-central agents. In the Training Strategy for LGAs doc-
ument, referred to above, the lack of this type of efficiency was marked as one of 
the drawbacks of existing training and development practices. As to the practices 
of recruitment and selection and rewarding the situation will not be different (see 
Tables 2.2-2.4). 
Another type of efficiency that needs to be taken into account derives from the 
plain fact that expertise is expensive. For that reason, irrespective of other rea-
sons that may make sense, it can be wise for local authorities to let experts in the 
central government do certain pieces of work as an alternative to hiring experts 
themselves to that end. Doing so is also a matter of sharing costs between those 
authorities. In Tables 2.2-2.4 this is referred to as the economy-of-scale ad-
vantage of centralization. 
 
HRM decentralization and HRM fairness 
More than other managers, HR managers serve two parties in the organization 
(Ulrich et al. 2007). On the one hand, they work for the organization as a whole. 
This part of their job was dealt with in the discussion of HRM effectiveness. On 
the other hand, they have to guard the interests of employees. This part of their 
job gives rise to an additional dimension to take into account when weighing the 
pros and cons of HRM decentralization: fairness. As defined by Jenkins (2012), 
fairness means, in short, equal opportunities for all employees. Worded in a more 
articulated way, this statement means that decisions that affect employees are fair 
when they are based on business- and policy-related criteria only, devoid of dis-
crimination, arbitrariness and secrecy, and thus safeguard equal opportunities for 
all employees. With regard to recruitment and selection this means that all (cate-
gories of) eligible applicants get the same treatment, irrespective of their racial 
background and their personal relationships with decision makers. With regard to 
rewarding and training and development it means that the same set of criteria is 
used for all (categories of) employees. Those criteria can be anything; rewarding 
criteria may include an employee’s job level, seniority, performance level and so 
on; criteria for providing training and development opportunities may include 
needs felt by the organization as well as needs of the employees themselves. The 
selection of those criteria is not a fairness issue. What counts is that chosen crite-
ria, whatever they are, are consistently applied to the workforce as a whole. 
For safeguarding fairness across local authorities some form of centralization 
is evidently needed, if only to prevent the development of systematic policy dif-
ferences between districts (see Tables 2.2-2.4). A case in point is the availability 
of budgets. Under centralized conditions the central government can make sure 
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that investments in training and development are equal throughout the country. 
As to fairness within the workforces of local authorities the story is different. In 
making this happen, both centralization and decentralization have an advantage 
(see Tables 2.2-2.4). Local, compared to central, authorities are in a better posi-
tion to respect the interests of their employees due to the fact that they can close-
ly examine the particular situation of each employee. Central authorities, on the 
other hand, are less likely than their local counterparts to apply non-objective 
criteria as decision makers due to their distance to the particular field. Centraliza-
tion helps to preclude tribalistic and other types of discrimination in the execu-
tion of HRM practices. 
HRM at work: experiences in two LGAs 
From the preceding sections two things have become clear. First, current legisla-
tion leaves, by and large, little room for HRM decentralization in Tanzanian Lo-
cal Government Authorities (despite the initial ambitions of reformers that initi-
ated decentralization programs in 1999). Second, the quality of HRM in Tanzani-
an LGAs in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness is best guaranteed 
through a substantial degree of HRM decentralization. The combination of these 
two conflicting realities seems to create an embarrassing situation for human re-
source managers and other members of LGA organizations. For them, decentrali-
zation is something badly needed and simultaneously difficult to attain. The 
question remains as to how this group of people experience this situation. In or-
der to find answers, the authors of this chapter have conducted a study in two 
districts (Kinemo et al. 2015). Both districts were in Dodoma: the urban Dodoma 
Municipal Council and the rural Chamwino District Council. In the present sec-
tion the key outcomes of this study are presented. The actual level of HRM-
decentralization is described, as is, in relation to this, the experienced quality of 
HRM practices in use in the two districts. As to the latter, the concepts of effec-
tiveness, efficiency, and fairness, as they were coined in the preceding section, 
serve as a descriptive framework. Furthermore, the setup of the section as a 
whole parallels the structure of the two preceding sections in that the research 
outcomes in regard to recruitment and selection, rewarding, and training and de-
velopment are successively dealt with.  
 
Experiences with recruitment and selection practices 
Both in the Dodoma Municipal Council and in the Chamwino District Council 
the local managers have practically no influence on the recruitment and the selec-
tion of their staff. The centralization rules described in the first section of this 
chapter tend to be put into practice in full. The legislation does leave room, how-
ever, for certain local inputs regarding the recruitment and selection processes 
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and in Dodoma and Chamwino councilors and other actors do make use thereof 
indeed. This state of affairs gives rise to several problems according to the expe-
riences of the people of Dodoma and Chamwino. 
To begin with, there appear to be serious problems with effectiveness. The 
councils, due to their dependence on the central government for budget approval, 
cannot always get an adequate number of staff. Furthermore, Chamwino Council 
often finds it difficult to retain centrally recruited employees when they become 
unable to cope with rural circumstances, a typical outcome of poor selection de-
cisions by central agencies. A specific example is that of a centrally selected 
driver who was apparently professionally inept. Another manifestation of ineffec-
tiveness is that quite often vacancies remain unfilled for far too long as a conse-
quence of the many recruitment and selection steps that have to be taken. A peri-
od of six months from defining an employment need to the actual employment of 
someone is not exceptional. 
Local actors such as councilors are especially involved in the appointment of 
lower grade personnel. Remarkably, this was associated with recruitment and 
selection ineffectiveness rather than effectiveness, because improper decision 
criteria were seen to infiltrate decision-making processes. Put bluntly, councilors 
used to demand their own relatives and friends to be selected. All in all, the ef-
fectiveness of recruitment and selection processes, as the people in the Dodoma 
and Chamwino districts experience them, thus tends to fall short of the expecta-
tions they have. 
The Dodoma and Chamwino people likewise experience the efficiency of re-
cruitment and selection processes to be low. The councils’ dependency on central 
agencies and the resulting complexity of procedures generates several forms of 
inefficiency. The procedures not only take up much time, they also give rise to 
economic inefficiency because, in anticipation of the finalization of long-lasting 
appointment procedures, temporary workers may need to be employed using the 
funds of the councils themselves. In Chamwino a lot of money is invested further 
in the retention of employees who, inappropriately recruited by a central agency, 
are not comfortable with the circumstances of remote stations. 
As to the fairness of the selection and retention processes the above-
mentioned fact that councillors sometimes demand their own relatives and 
friends to be selected is relevant. It points to the existence of local forms of nepo-
tism or possible tribalism. Furthermore, members of the Dodoma and Chamwino 
LGAs are often unaware of the reasons why candidates are hired when appoint-
ments are made by central agencies. Doubts about the nonexistence of nepotism 
at the central level are the result. 
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Experiences with practices of rewarding  
In Dodoma and Chamwino salary systems are applied in the same way that they 
are applied elsewhere in the country. Decision-making power regarding things 
such as salary levels and the payment of salaries is thus entirely in the hands of 
central government authorities. Nationwide norms and standards maintain con-
trol. That is not to say that the rewarding practices in use in the two districts are 
devoid of decentralization elements. Those elements, though, relate to compensa-
tion in terms of non-salary benefits only. 
The non-salary benefits that are given include material ones (incidental bo-
nuses, allowances) and non-material ones (such as recommendation letters). The 
authorities in Dodoma and Chamwino provide those benefits to selected employ-
ees for three types of reasons. Firstly, they do so in order to reward and conse-
quently promote excellent performance and hard working. Recommendation let-
ters are provided to that end, but also bonuses in cash. In Dodoma, for instance, 
high-performing teachers can get 200,000 Tsh. Secondly, compensations for em-
ployees may form part of an attraction and retention strategy, especially in the 
Chamwino district. Clinical officers, for instance, are given a fully furnished 
house (not as a gift but for accommodation) in order to reduce unattractive em-
ployment aspects. The reason is scarcity: a shortage of staff forces the authorities 
to allocate budgets for this type of compensation. Thirdly, incentives offered can 
be based on the assessment of specific needs in specific areas. The Dodoma Mu-
nicipal Council provides, for instance, motorbikes and fuel costs to extension 
officers and to staff in the administration department. Subsistence allowances for 
first-appointment staff and housing allowances for department heads are other 
examples of benefits in this category. 
A number of observations can be made as to the effectiveness of practices of 
rewarding on the whole. To begin with, the people in Dodoma and Chamwino 
have doubts about the effectiveness of the applied salary system (salary scales, 
salary levels). These doubts, though, are only partially associated with the fact 
that it is a system of the central government. A complaint is that the fixed salary 
levels fail to motivate the employees because salaries are paid irrespectively of 
work performance. Another complaint is that the rules underlying the salary sys-
tem are inconsistent. Employees with a similar educational background but work-
ing in different organizations are differently salaried, as are employees working 
in the same organization but falling under different ministries. Complaints like 
these, however, are not exclusively applicable to centrally controlled systems. 
They refer to imperfections of the salary system as such and there is no reason to 
believe that decentralization would help to repair those imperfections. An excep-
tion may be the following imperfection of job-salary connections within the sys-
tem. As experienced by the Dodoma and Chamwino people, complexity levels 
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and responsibility levels associated with jobs are not sufficiently reflected in sal-
ary levels. This may be due to the fact that the central authorities that decide sala-
ry levels are unfamiliar with the actual contents of jobs in local government or-
ganizations. Local authorities would be better equipped, then, to take care of this 
part of the salary system design. 
Doubts also exist regarding the effectiveness of some de-central elements of 
the reward systems in use. One problem is that allowances, such as those made 
available by the Dodoma and Chamwino Councils, are always provided very late. 
Regardless of their purpose, this can only reduce their usefulness. Another prob-
lem is that the applied criteria for providing performance bonuses tend to be far 
from clear. Sometimes it is felt that loyalty, rather than high performance, is re-
warded. For promoting excellence and hard work this is of course counterproduc-
tive. It thus seems that the local authorities are somehow poorly equipped to 
manage these practices. There is, however, the special case of recommendation 
letters. There are no complaints about the way that this type of reward is provid-
ed. Unfortunately it is not highly appreciated, because employees prefer tangible 
rewards. 
Mostly positive things can be said regarding the efficiency of the reward sys-
tem in Dodoma and Chamwino. The machinery for administrating salaries is 
known to work smoothly, with salaries mostly being paid on time. The involved 
central governmental agencies can apparently be relied on. Efficiency of the non-
centralized elements of the reward system in use is not really an issue, given the 
low volume of those elements. The work associated with them is not that time 
and money consuming. 
In analysing the fairness and unfairness of reward systems it makes little sense 
to pay attention to the formal rules underlying these practices such as the rules 
for linking salary levels to jobs and the rules for maximizing the amount of mon-
ey available for performance bonuses. The fairness of those rules is always open 
to discussion and is furthermore unrelated to the involved level (cen-
tral/decentral) of decision-making. What counts is the way the rules are applied. 
If they are transparently and consistently applied to all employees, unaffected by 
elements of discrimination, arbitrariness and secrecy, they are considered to be 
fair. As for that, the people in Dodoma and Chamwino have their doubts about 
the adequacy of the way performance bonuses are distributed. The fear is that 
loyal employees are privileged, which is not only counterproductive (as charac-
terized above) but also discriminatory. It is perhaps hard for local authorities to 
refrain from that type of discrimination. 
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Experiences with training and development practices 
Training and development practices are expected to solve problems. They need to 
close the gap between available and needed employee competences. Their infra-
structure in the Dodoma and Chamwino districts is strictly split up into two dis-
tinct steps. The first one consists of the analyses of training needs (assessments 
of the training needs of employees and employee categories) and the preparation 
of training plans. Local managers do this part of the job. The second step, which 
is at the discretion of central agencies, involves the evaluation of submitted train-
ing plans and, more importantly, the provision of funds for the execution of plans 
once approved. This state of affairs is neatly in accordance with formal regula-
tions (see first section of this chapter). It appears, however, to generate problems 
rather than solutions. 
The effectiveness of the training and development practices in use, as Dodoma 
and Chamwino HR managers experience it, is hampered by a lack of connected-
ness of the two steps mentioned above. As a result of that lack, badly needed 
funds may not be allowed in full, or not in time, or piecemeal only. The decision-
makers in the central government are apparently insufficiently aware of local 
concerns. As a consequence, the workforces in the two districts tend to be sub-
optimally trained. Too few employees are actually trained.  
Likewise, the efficiency of the work evidently suffers from the described state 
of affairs. Performing training need assessments, translating those assessments 
into training plans and, finally, submitting those plans in an orderly fashion is a 
demanding and bureaucratic job. Performing that job is a waste of time and mon-
ey when there is no reasonable guarantee of funds. 
There are no serious fairness problems associated with the described state of 
affairs, although the unpredictability of the decisions made by the central gov-
ernment may give rise, of course, to feelings of arbitrariness. Outcomes of deci-
sions can therefore be felt to be unfair. In principle, rules are applied without any 
considerations other than formal, objective and impersonal ones. Furthermore 
those rules, disputable as they inevitably always are, are not inherently unfair by 
themselves. On the contrary, they assure that employees in Dodoma and Cham-
wino are not treated differently from their colleagues elsewhere in the country. 
In the preceding section, a series of advantages were listed and associated 
with HRM-decentralization or HRM-centralization (Tables 2.2-2.4). Taken to-
gether, the research findings presented in this section show that many of the at-
tributed advantages are clearly reflected in the experiences of HR managers and 
other members of the Dodoma and Chamwino LGAs. These people forthrightly 
recognize the disadvantages as well as the advantages associated with both cen-
tralization and decentralization. The research findings thus do not give rise to 
whatever revision of the contents of Tables 2-4 They do, though, suggest some 
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details that may be added. Most notably, a number of negative outcomes of HRM 
centralization, additional to the ones listed in the tables, came into view: 
 (Effectiveness problem) Unresponsiveness of central agencies may result in 
insufficient numbers of employees hired. 
 (Effectiveness problem) Unfamiliarity of central agencies with local circum-
stances may result in the appointment of employees who, being unfit for those 
circumstances, are hard to retain. 
 (Effectiveness problem) As a consequence of the tardiness of central agen-
cies’ operations, vacancies sometimes remain unfilled for too long. 
 (Effectiveness problem) Unresponsiveness of central agencies may result in 
an insufficient number of employees that are actually trained. 
 (Efficiency problem) Local budgets sometimes need to be spent on filling 
temporary vacancies when budgets are made available too late by central 
agencies. 
 (Efficiency problem) Local budgets sometimes need to be spent on retaining 
employees who, being appointed by central agencies, do not feel comfortable 
with local circumstances. 
 (Efficiency problem) Local agents often invest time and money in the devel-
opment of training plans that eventually fail to be approved by central agents.  
Conclusions 
Saying that HRM decentralization in Tanzanian governmental organizations is 
something worth to think about is an understatement, given the state of affairs 
depicted in the preceding sections. Firstly, it was shown that the existing legisla-
tion tends to imply a lot of limitations regarding the realization of HRM decen-
tralization. Thereafter it was argued that the quality of HRM is endangered in 
several respects when those limitations are actually put into practice. Finally, a 
description of the situation in Dodoma and Chamwino made clear that the latter 
is indeed happening. At first sight, this state of affairs seems to call for another 
local government reform program, which will once more enlarge the discretion-
ary power of local authorities: still more HRM decentralization, in short. Indeed, 
a conclusion that can be drawn from the facts collected in this chapter is that the 
human resource management of LGAs would benefit from a number of thor-
oughgoing decentralization measures, such as: 
 A change of rules in such a way that recruitment decisions can only be made 
with the explicit consent of the local authorities, or even on the initiative of 
those authorities. 
 A change of rules in such a way that local adaptations of reward systems in 
use become possible (salary levels becoming differently linked to jobs across 
districts). 
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 A change of rules in such a way that the task of taking care of the training and 
development of local civil servants is entirely transferred from the central 
government to the local governments. 
 
Measures like these might indeed be beneficial, but it would be short-sighted to 
take them without simultaneously paying attention to a number of issues that 
fundamentally affect HRM quality in Tanzanian LGAs. These issues came into 
view in the preceding sections. Three of them are elaborated below and each of 
the resulting elaborations gives rise to the need for more measures to be taken in 
addition to extra decentralization measures. 
1. Some indispensable contributions to the quality of local HRM can only be 
made through the centralization of decision-making. Thoughtless decentrali-
zation actions might only destroy those contributions. Firstly, in regards to 
HRM effectiveness, a central agency will always be needed in order to keep 
an eye on the way local authorities do their work. Secondly, in regards to 
HRM efficiency, it would be a waste of resources if local authorities were 
made responsible for tasks such as nationwide recruiting and nationwide ne-
gotiations with suppliers of training and development services. Finally, in re-
gards to HRM fairness, only the influence of the central government can 
make sure that civil servants all over the country are treated alike. To safe-
guard the quality of local HRM in these respects, a number of centralized 
HRM tasks thus need to be solidified rather than weakened. 
2. In regards to the fairness of HRM, local authorities may sometimes be liable 
to give in to forces that privilege certain people in the community. As a con-
sequence, forms of tribalism and nepotism in the community are suspected 
and this plain fact could be a reason to curtail the power of the local authori-
ties somehow. It would, however, make no sense to reduce the decentraliza-
tion of HRM responsibilities to that end. Entitling central agencies instead of 
local authorities to make certain types of decisions would only relocate the 
problem and would furthermore generate new problems. Rather than re-
centralization, the instalment of fairness inspectors who work independently 
of authorities could be a solution. 
3. The most fundamental issue that complicates the regulation of HRM centrali-
zation and HRM decentralization is that civil servants find themselves in a 
situation of dual-employment. They actually have two employers. On the one 
hand, they are employees of their own local authority; on the other hand they 
are employed by the central government. By itself, this fact is already confus-
ing. What makes things worse, however, is that the interests of the two em-
ployers do not always coincide. A local authority may, for instance, have rea-
sons to want to appoint a certain official in its own district because of the spe-
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cific competences of that person and the central government may simultane-
ously have reasons not to appoint that person there because those competenc-
es are needed elsewhere. There is a conflict of two equally respectable inter-
ests, then. In solving that type of conflict, measures in terms of HRM central-
ization or HRM decentralization can only fail. They would be in favour of the 
interests of one party at the expense of the interests of the other. A different 
type of solution is needed: one that helps to integrate local and central inter-
ests. It is too much to elaborate on this issue here. In any case, solutions 
should preferably not consist of new and meticulous demarcations of rights 
and responsibilities. Instead, recipes for optimizing co-decision making pro-
cesses of local and central authorities are called for. 
 
This chapter started by raising a couple of simple questions about HRM decen-
tralization in Tanzanian governmental organizations. It ended by giving complex 
answers to these questions and, in addition to that, raising new questions. For the 
reader, this might be a discouraging and frustrating experience. Hopefully, how-
ever, the chapter made clear to him/her that simple answers will always run the 
risk of being false. Hopefully, the chapter provided him/her with concepts to be 
used when deliberating how to act. In fact, the chapter can be seen as a series of 
lessons learnt from decentralization efforts in the past. Viewed that way, it may 
serve to equip the makers of future policies to do their job, however puzzling the 
lessons may sometimes feel. 
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Case 1 Career journey 
Case 
Mr. Juma Halid is a Teacher at Jitegemee Primary School. He was employed by 
the Chamwino District Council in 1983 as a Grade A Teacher. After working for 
one year he began the National Service Training, as it was compulsory for all 
government employees who had acquired post-secondary education. The Minis-
try of Defense and National Service posted him to Makutupora Training Camp 
where he was trained as an army recruit for 6 months. The last 6 months were 
spent on extracurricular skill training, which included animal husbandry and 
farming. He successfully completed the National Service Training and returned 
to his place of work. 
After working for 2 years, Mr. Juma Halid felt that his knowledge and skills 
were depreciating. This perception stemmed from his dissatisfaction with the 
work environment, as he had been posted in a remote village with no educational 
and social amenities. While his major interest was reading, he found it difficult to 
engage in this activity as there was no access to requisite reading materials. He 
applied for a council scholarship to pursue a Diploma in Education Course. He 
was lucky enough to be among the few teachers whose applications were ap-
proved. He successfully completed his studies at Mpwapwa College and reported 
back to his employer. He was transferred from Jitegemee Primary School to 
Mwangaza Secondary School, which is 10 km from the town. He was happy with 
the progress he had made and the work environment was much better for him. 
He got married in 1992. By 2002 his family had grown, having had 3 children. 
Owing to low pay in government schools, the standard of living became increas-
ingly worse. He strongly believed that the future of his family could be bright if 
he pursued a career path other than education. In 2003 he arranged for an evening 
programme at the University of Dodoma (UDOM) to study a Bachelor’s degree 
in Sociology. This training programme was a private arrangement and the em-
ployer was not aware of it. He was hesitant to report the matter to the Council 
since it was a course unrelated to his career. He struggled to pursue the sociology 
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degree while teaching. He was able to continue with his planned studies because 
he happened to have a financially secure uncle who decided to sponsor him, and 
he successfully graduated in 2009. Upon completion of the sociology degree he 
approached the Council’s Human Resource Officer for a considered transfer from 
the Education Department to the Community Development Department. This 
request was turned down on two grounds, the first being that all employees had 
to follow the Council’s Training Programme, and the second being that employ-
ees had to study in the specialties for which they were employed. The employer 
ordered him to resume his former teaching career. 
 
Questions 
1. What HRM decisions were made in this case? 
2. To what degree is each of the decisions a matter of decentralization or cen-
tralization? 
3. For each of the decisions identified, explain the advantages and disadvantages 
of HRM interventions in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and fairness. 
4. Based on the experience of this case, are there reasons for modifying labor 
laws? 
 
 
 
 
Case 2 A bird’s eye view of the  
May Day Ceremony  
Case 
Like other employment institutions, LGAs in Tanzania make use of compensa-
tion tools in their attempts to develop employee loyalty and commitment. Coun-
cils give different packages depending on their resources. Some councils offer 
employee incentives based on the assessment of specific needs in certain places 
depending on available resources. For instance, motorbikes are provided to 
members of staff whose job descriptions involve travelling long distances on su-
pervision trips. The officers are given a specified expense allowance to meet fuel 
and service costs for every week.  
Other incentives offered by LGAs include a subsistence allowance for first 
appointment staff, a housing allowance for heads of departments, and a leave 
allowance for all employees. Some councils give monetary awards to the best 
performing schools as well as fully furnished staff houses. The assets, however, 
are not personal but belong to the council. Some councils offer recommendation 
letters in recognition of exemplary performance. However, this type of reward is 
invariably not much appreciated by employees. Employee preference is for tan-
gible rewards such as money, furniture, etc. 
One of the compensation tools that are used in some districts is the annual al-
location of certain rewards to selected employees on the 1st of May (International 
Workers Day). As in the Tanzanian public sector, LGAs hold ceremonies on the 
1st of May. The May Day ceremony involves an array of activities, ranging from 
leaders’ speeches re-affirming organization commitment in spearheading em-
ployee rights and welfare to the aforementioned allocation of rewards.  
Potential recipients of the May Day rewards are identified through the in-
volvement of employees in their respective departments. Departments organize 
forums in which members of staff vote to elect hardworking employees. A few 
names are proposed from which the top three with majority votes are entitled to 
vie for the single award. The award is given both in terms of a certificate and a 
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monetary sum. The amount may be between 300 and 400 dollars. This indeed 
increases employee morale to boost the work ethic. Much as this procedure is 
expected to be upholded, the process can sometimes be hampered by employee 
campaigns to persuade fellow employees to vote for them. It is a pity that some 
supervisors can, at times, abuse their powers by appointing themselves as the 
best workers in order to gain recognition that they may not necessarily deserve. 
Influential workers are sometimes elected and recommended for prizes at the ex-
pense of truly industrious workers. In such circumstances, the election results do 
not necessarily give employees the rewards they deserve for their hard work and 
hence cause low employee morale.  
Questions 
1. What HRM decision(s) is/are made in the May Day case? 
2. To what degree is that decision (are those decisions) a matter of HRM decen-
tralization or HRM centralization? 
3. As to the decision(s) identified, explain the advantages and disadvantages of 
the involved HRM practices in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, and fair-
ness. 
4. Generally speaking, do you think that the rewards given to staff on May Day 
are appropriate and satisfactory? 
5. Do you think that the processes used by councils to reward employees on 
May Day are appropriate?  
6. Based on this case study, can you identify reasons for modifying labor laws? 
 
 
 
 
3 
Tensions in politico-administrative 
relations in Tanzanian local 
government 
Wilhelm Mafuru, Deogratias Mpenzi, Idda Lyatonga Swai, Oscar 
Tefurukwa, Orest Masue, Richard Ngowi & Wilfred Lameck  
Introduction 
The relations between local politicians and local administrators are considered 
important for the performance of Local Government Authorities (LGAs). Good 
collaboration among the councillors on one hand, and between the councillors 
and Director and Heads of Departments of the local administration on the other 
hand, is viewed as a prerequisite for the local authorities to realise their objec-
tives (Daily News-Tanzania, August 28th, 2012). Despite the good intention of 
collaboration, Lyatonga (2006) notes some incidents that seem to indicate the 
existence of tense relations in local authorities. The author showed that divided 
interests, among other reasons, escalated the tensions and eventually led to con-
flicts which frequently delayed decision-making processes and hindered the im-
plementation of policies and programs (Lyatonga 2006). It has also been the case 
that tensions tend to limit interaction and hinder mutual cooperation among the 
key actors (politicians and administrators) in LGAs, the consequence of which is 
LGAs fail to achieve their objectives. Likewise, conflicts have become widely 
reported and the revelation of the existence of such conflicts is seen through the 
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suspension of council directors, dissolution of councils and sacking of local gov-
ernment officials. For example, in 2002 the Prime Minister dissolved the Dar es 
Salaam City Council, and Directors in Kibaha, Mkuranga, Arumeru, and Dodo-
ma councils were suspended as a result of tense relations and conflicts within the 
local government authorities (Leticia 2008).  
Judging from these incidents, it appears that councillors and administrators in 
Tanzanian LGAs do not get along very well. But is this the real case, or are poor 
relations the exception and good relations the rule? This chapter sets out to ad-
dress the following questions: what do politico-administrative relations in Tanza-
nian LGAs look like and how can they be explained? The answers presented here 
are based on research in two Tanzanian LGAs: Kinondoni Municipal Council 
and Mvomero District Council (see Mafuru et al. 2015). 
To describe and explain the nature of politico-administrative relations in Tan-
zanian local government three ideal types or models are used. These ideal types 
of relations have been constructed from models frequently presented in the litera-
ture: the classical model, the village model and the adversarial model. In the light 
of these models, relations are described in terms of 1) the degree of interaction 
between councillors and administration, which refers to the intensity of their co-
operation in the course of the day-to-day decision making process and the im-
plementation of decisions, programs and policies; 2) the degree of intervention, 
which refers to the extent to which councillors and administrators interfere in 
each other’s domain; and 3) the degree of conflicts, which refers to the extent to 
which irritation, rows and disputes occur between them. For the purpose of ex-
plaining relations between councillors and administrators, the focus is on their 
mutual perceptions, and the extent of their mutual trust and loyalty.  
The subsequent sections of this chapter are organised as follows. The second 
section conceptualises politico-administrative relations as reflected in the litera-
ture, and discusses three ideal types of relations, namely the classical, the village 
and the adversarial model. Section three contains a description of the formal ar-
rangements between councillors and administrators, their roles and functions as 
stipulated in legislation and guidelines. In sections four and five, the empirical 
data from the research are presented and analysed. The chapter ends with conclu-
sions and reflections on politico-administrative relations in Tanzanian local gov-
ernment. 
Conceptualising politico-administrative relations  
The LGAs in Tanzania are not unique. There are many experiences that are more 
or less similar to those in other countries worldwide, despite the fact that some 
context-specific differences in practice between countries are inevitable. Ten-
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sions between councillors and administrators are one of the most common fea-
tures of LGAs in the world. Therefore, the politico-administrative relations in 
Tanzania can be conceptualised and analysed using general theories and models. 
Scholars of public administration and political science provide different models, 
which in this chapter are referred to as ‘the ideal types of politico-administrative 
relations’. An ideal type being a theoretical construct consisting of a number of 
dimensions logically related to each other, which is used as the yardstick to de-
scribe the key features of a real situation or phenomenon. 
We have selected three key ideal-types from the literature to provide a theoret-
ical footing for analysing the relationship between councillors and administrators 
in Tanzania. These are the classical model, the village model and the adversarial 
model. The rationale for our choice of these three models is to capture as wide a 
picture as possible by including all kinds of variations in politico-administrative 
relations that reflect the real situation in the Tanzanian context. In the three sub-
sequent sub-sections we will discuss these models, focusing on the characteristic 
features of each. Through the use of diagram, we will illustrate how the three 
models describe politico-administrative relations in the Tanzanian Local Gov-
ernment Authorities (see Figure 3.1). 
 
The classical model  
The classical model of politico-administrative relations stems from patriarchs of 
public administration science, for instance Weber and Wilson, and is character-
ized by a clear separation of roles between politicians and administrators, where 
the former concentrate on political decision-making and the latter on the neutral 
non-partisan execution of decisions (Campbell & Peters 1988; Overeem 2005; 
Rosenbloom 2008). Under this model, there is a low degree of interaction be-
tween the two parties, and politicians and administrators do not generally inter-
fere in each other’s activities. Administrators are informed about the decisions, 
programs and policies established by politicians and report to them about their 
implementation. Thus administrators are not involved in the actual decision-
making regarding the policies despite the fact that their technical knowledge and 
expertise serve as a necessary input in the decision-making process. In this mod-
el, administrators are the ones responsible for policy implementation and enjoy a 
certain amount of discretion. Politicians, meanwhile, are expected not to interfere 
in the execution of policies, despite having the formal authority to do so. In the 
ideal sense it is expected for the administrators to respect the legitimate position 
and roles of politicians as the competent decision-makers (Aberbach, Putnam & 
Rockman 1981; Campbell & Peters 1988; Schreurs et al. 2011). A separation of 
roles can only function in practice if both parties have a clear perception of and 
respect for each other’s roles. It also assumes that politicians trust that adminis-
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trators are competent and willing to loyally execute political decisions, and that 
administrators believe that politicians are both competent and willing to make the 
right decisions in the interest of the community. A clear separation of roles and 
mutual respect and trust will result in a low level of conflict between politicians 
and administrators.  
 
The village model 
In the village model there is no clear separation of roles between politicians and 
administrators. Politicians and administrators frequently interact. They engage in 
discussions about political priorities and strategies, and both give their opinion 
on the implementation of political decisions: decision-making about politics and 
implementation are up to a certain point a joint enterprise. The model also im-
plies that councillors and administrators intervene in the primary domain of the 
other. That is to say, politicians themselves will sometimes perform tasks that are 
administrative in nature, such as collecting taxes or acting as supervisors over the 
execution of projects, and administrators will undertake activities that are typical-
ly political in nature, such as acting as interest brokers between different social 
groups. Under the village model, together politicians and administrators form a 
closed community. The members of this community share norms and values. The 
community is characterised by the overlap of responsibilities and the lack of 
structurally dominant actors in the relationship. The village model presupposes 
mutual trust and respect and the loyal execution of decisions that are basically the 
outcome of common decision-making in the community. Given these characteris-
tics, the level of conflicts between politicians and administrators will be low. Is it 
an ideal relationship? In the perception of Peters (1995), the author who devel-
oped the village model, the members of this community are the elites of the soci-
ety, and although they may work for common goals these do not necessarily co-
incide with the general interest of society. 
 
The adversarial model 
The adversarial model features a permanent struggle for power whereby council-
lors and administrators try to gain or retain control over decision-making. Coun-
cillors strive to impose their policy priorities and intervene in the implementation 
of policies, while administrators try to protect their own priorities and make po-
litical decisions. The key assumption is that both councillors and administrators 
have their own individual goals and strive to maximize them. These goals may be 
motivated by (different) political affiliations, ideals, specific public interests or 
professional service morale (Peters 1995; Aberbach & Rockman 1976). They 
may also concern personal benefits, an assumption upheld by public choice 
scholars. For councillors, for example, to the aim would be to maximize votes 
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and win elections, which create benefits such as prestige and power (Downs 
1967). On the other hand, personal benefits sought after by administrators would 
include a good salary and reputation, power and patronage, and other preroga-
tives pertaining to the office (Niskanen 1971).  
As a general rule, the fact that councillors and administrators strive to maxim-
ise their different individual goals goes hand in hand with a lack of mutual trust 
and loyalty. As a result, mutual intervention in each other’s primary domain can 
be expected to happen relatively frequently, as either party cannot expect the oth-
er to look after their interests. Misunderstandings and open or covert conflicts 
will occur with some frequency; genuine cooperation will be scarce. Which of 
the two parties will dominate the relationship; councillors or administrators? This 
depends on the resources available to each, as well as on mutual interdependen-
cies and strategies used. In a nutshell, the adversarial model is characterised by 
political behaviour, where councillors and administrators try to maximise differ-
ent personal or public interests. 
  
 
Figure 3.1 An illustration of the three politico-administrative models 
 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, the three models are ideal types. They can be used to assess 
the features of real-world relations between politicians and administrators. The 
real-world situation may not match exactly with any of the ideal types, but some-
times it may come close one of them. Most situations of the real world will, how-
ever, have just a few features of one or even two of the ideal types. One can use a 
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triangle to model the variation in the politico-administrative interaction patterns 
described above. Each of the corners of the triangle indicates an ideal interaction 
type. On the basis of empirical research, one may locate a real world situation 
somewhere in the triangle.  
The classic model depicts a situation in which low degrees of intervention (in-
terference) and interaction (cooperation) go hand in hand with a low number of 
conflicts between politicians and administrators. The village model depicts high 
degrees of interaction and intervention and low degrees of conflict between the 
two parties. The third ideal type, the adversarial model, portrays low degrees of 
interaction and high degrees of intervention and a relatively high level of con-
flict.  
The formal arrangement of politico-administrative  
relations in Tanzanian LGAs  
The legal framework mandates the local councillors as policy makers and the 
administrators as the implementers of policies and plans. These mandates are 
provided under section 118 (1) (a) and (b) of the Local Government (District Au-
thorities) Act No. 7 of 1982. The Council has the function of formulating, coor-
dinating and supervising the implementation of the district’s development plans. 
Furthermore, the councillors are the overseers of the council and they have a re-
sponsibility to monitor and control the performance of bureaucrats. Administra-
tors on the other hand have a responsibility to keep the councillors informed of 
all activities taking place in the council as stipulated in section 63, 73, 117 and 
118 of LGA Act No.7 of 1982. This includes advising the councillors in deci-
sion-making and carrying out the day-to-day functions of the council.  
Legislation explicitly forbids individual councillors to interfere in the admin-
istration of legal obligations, policies and plans decided on by the council. It is a 
criminal offence for a councillor to attempt to influence the director or any other 
member of staff or agent of the council not to enforce an obligation. The offence 
is punished by a fine or imprisonment of up to two years. Moreover, the council-
lors are guided by a code of conduct that regulates their behaviour and relation-
ship with the bureaucrats (URT 2010). The code prohibits the councillors from 
interfering in the administration of the council or instructing any employee of the 
council without authorisation.  
The formal rules in respect to the tasks and competences of councillors and 
administrators and the way they are supposed to behave towards each other clear-
ly reflect the classical model discussed in Section 2. The council is responsible 
for policy making. It may delegate its responsibilities to standing committees, but 
membership of the committees for finance and administration and for education 
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affairs is restricted to council members, while other committees must consist of 
no less than two thirds of the members of the district council (Act. No. 7, S. 76). 
Council committees are decision-making bodies in which plans are discussed and 
scrutinized by councillors with the support and advice of administrators. Howev-
er, passing the budget, amendment of the budget, passing development plans or 
establishing byelaws cannot be delegated to committees (United Republic of 
Tanzania 2005). The formal role of administrators is to inform and advise the 
councillors (policy makers and supervisors) and to implement council decisions. 
In this respect administrators are protected by law from interference from indi-
vidual councillors in their day-to-day operations. 
Description of politico-administrative  
relations in Tanzanian LGAs  
In this section, using the dimensions of the ideal types developed in Section 2, 
we sketch a picture of actual relations between politicians and administrators in 
Tanzanian local government based on the research conducted in Kinondoni Mu-
nicipal Council and Mvomero District Council.  
 
Interaction 
As indicated in Section 3, the law separates the functions of councillors and ad-
ministrators. Administrators have an explicit mandate to advise the council con-
cerning the decisions for which it is responsible. This mandate emerges from the 
technical competences in respective administrative fields of work, which the 
councillors are not legally obliged to have. Otherwise, administrators must sub-
mit themselves to the loyal execution of council decisions. The council is the on-
ly body with the formal authority make decisions regarding council matters and 
supervise their administration. However, the council is not supposed to engage 
itself in day-to-day implementation. These formal arrangements would suggest 
that interaction between councillors and administrators is limited.  
The practice in Tanzanian local government reflects up to a certain point the 
formal separation of functions. Administrators prepare policies, plans and pro-
grams and table them for decision-making in the standing committees and the 
full council. They take the lead in the execution of council decisions and report 
on the implementation of plans and projects. Councillors discuss and decide on 
the proposals put forward by the administrators. This working relationship, 
where councillors and administrators have their own role, is not without prob-
lems in practice. This particularly concerns information provided by the adminis-
trators.  
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In respect to council meetings the law provides that councillors should be giv-
en documents in advance in order read them thoroughly. However, in practice 
there are indications that the documents reach councillors late. The councillors 
experience this situation as a denial of the right to be informed adequately in or-
der to make informed decisions. Councillors voice their frustration in statements 
such as follows: 
‘Normally the administrators tend to circulate call messages one day before the occurrence 
of an important meeting of the council.’ 
‘So there is poor communication between us, councillors, and our counterpart, the adminis-
trative officials. Most of the information comes to me in an ad hoc manner; their behaviour 
to frequently call for meetings that way makes me totally unprepared… I feel I am only used 
to pass things.’ (Mafuru et al. 2015: 38)  
However, these flaws in the timely provision of information regarding council 
meetings are especially manifest in the case of councillors from remote areas, so 
the sometimes-poor communication infrastructure seems to play a role. Other 
councillors are satisfied with the way they are informed by the administrators 
(Mafuru et al. 2015: 29-30).  
An information problem also occurs in respect to the supervisory role of 
councillors. Legislation requires that councillors ensure the collection and proper 
utilisation of revenues. So openness on the collection and expenditure of reve-
nues is of paramount importance. However, in some cases the practice indicates a 
lack of transparency. Councillors of Kinondoni Municipal Council reported that 
they were not informed correctly about the expenditures on projects such as the 
rehabilitation of roads (Mafuru et al. 2015: 40).  
While part of the interaction between councillors and administrators seems to 
fit the classical model – although inadequate information by administrators 
sometimes hinders councillors in their role – the research also showed that a 
more intense interaction takes place. Sometimes councillors and administrators 
genuinely cooperate in policy-making, and councillors contribute to the imple-
mentation of programs and plans as if they were part of the administration. On 
occasions when councillors find draft plans or budgets developed by the admin-
istration to be substandard, they take on the development of alternatives them-
selves, which are then submitted to administrators for discussion. This type of 
cooperation was found in Kinondoni Municipal Council, where the majority of 
the council members hold first and second degrees, amongst them retired officers 
from the public service with a variety of expertise (Mafuru et al. 2015: 41). 
Councillors and administrators on occasion cooperate in order to implement pro-
jects decided on by the council. It was reported that councillors were directly in-
volved in the collection of contributions and the day-to-day supervision of road 
construction (Mafuru et al. 2015: 50). Administrators acknowledge and appreci-
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ate the role councillors can play in influencing and mobilising the population to 
contribute and in tackling local challenges to policy implementation.  
All in all, while the interaction between councillors and administrators in part 
corresponds with the classical model, we can also find patterns of interaction that 
fit the village model. In the words of one of the councillors from Mvomero Dis-
trict Council:  
‘We are working together; we are receiving the technical and professional support of admin-
istrators. Such support enables us provide informed decisions and supervise implementation 
of the development activities such the construction of a secondary school, a dispensary, irri-
gation channels and a bridge in our ward. [...] In all decisions for the ward development, we 
are together for implementing the aimed projects’ (Mafuru et al. 2015: 38). 
 
Intervention 
To what extent do councillors and administrators interfere in each other’s do-
main, i.e. do they themselves engage in activities that, according to the formal 
separation of roles, belong to the competence of the other? The research in the 
two districts suggests that intervention is a widespread phenomenon. 
As mentioned above, formal rules explicitly forbid individual councillors to 
interfere in the administration of legal obligations and policies and plans decided 
by the council. If individual councillors want to take up issues with the admin-
istration, procedure prescribes they do so through the District Executive Director 
or the Municipal Executive Director, and not otherwise. In practice, councillors 
normally and frequently approach heads of departments or other officials to get 
clarifications on particular issues, to promote projects for their wards, or to ask 
for assistance in solving problems that their community faces. Administrators are 
not pleased by this behaviour due to the fact that councillors do not follow pro-
cedure to seek audience with the Executive Director. It also happens that in such 
situations councillors put forward their political agendas (Mafuru et al. 2015: 56). 
A practical example of an incidence of councillors intervening in the imple-
mentation of council decisions can be drawn from the Mvomero land eviction 
case. The council had decided to implement an effective land utilisation scheme 
that would consequently lead to the eviction of some people from their residen-
tial and farming land. The affected parties raised a lot of concerns especially due 
to the fact that, in the eyes of the councillors of the affected wards, the decision 
was taken too soon to permit people to prepare to move off the designated land. 
The councillors in question felt that it was first necessary to educate people on 
the benefits of the proposed land use plan and provide them with compensation 
and alternative settlement areas. They also felt that, being representatives of the 
people in their wards, they were obliged to defend the people’s interests by ad-
journing the implementation. So, they mobilised their people to resist the evic-
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tion. The administrators were not pleased by that action, and were of the opinion 
that the councillors were acting out of worries of lost confidence from their con-
stituency and lost support in the forthcoming elections (Mafuru et al. 2015: 33). 
The research also shows that administrators do not limit themselves to provid-
ing advice to the council and implementing council decisions. Administrators 
sometimes actively involve themselves in the political decision-making process. 
A practical example concerns discussions between the council and the adminis-
trators regarding budget allocations in Kinondoni Municipality for the fiscal year 
2011/2012. The councillors preferred a budget allocation of 70% for develop-
ment projects and 30% for recurrent expenditures, while the administrators pre-
ferred 60% for development and 40% for recurrent expenditure. It was difficult 
to reach an agreement, but after a long discussion the councillors agreed with the 
proposal put forward by the administrators (Mafuru et al. 2015: 42). Further-
more, on occasion, administrators seek the support of influential councillors to 
get projects approved by the council or to call in the assistance of the parent min-
istry in question.  
‘In some cases we find it very difficult to pass a certain issue through the council and we are 
sure the issue has a positive impact on the development of people, although it is of no politi-
cal interest to Councillors. Then, we normally ask the parent ministry to direct the council to 
implement such issue even if the Councillors do not buy it.’ (Mafuru et al. 2015:51) 
Moreover, administrators sometimes conscientiously ignore council decisions. In 
some cases council decisions regarding the allocation of funds for development 
projects are not respected. Administrators decide to re-allocate the funds to other 
projects and councillors are not informed. Councillors consider such a diversion 
of funds to be a justification for unfinished development projects. It also raises 
questions about who the real decision-makers are. 
‘In Sinza, the budgets of 95 million and 102 million Tsh were allocated to the rehabilitation 
of the Shekilango road and the NIT road respectively. Nothing was done, although the work 
was reported done.’ 
‘In fact the council meetings are just a formality. You pass decisions but other things are 
done. […] A good example is the last decision we made to build a normal market in Mbu-
rahati Ward; but we read in the newspaper that the Machinga complex shall be built instead. 
So what is this?’ (Mafuru et al. 2015: 40) 
So, the practice of politico-administrative relations is characterised by mutual 
intervention. Councillors actively interfere in the implementation of plans and 
policies by administrators, and administrators actively try to influence political 
decision-making and use their position to deviate from council decisions. This 
pattern fits the adversarial model better than the classical or village model. 
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Harmony or conflict? 
When we ask the question whether the relations between councillors and admin-
istrators in Tanzanian local government are overall harmonious or discordant, 
there is no simple answer. Some councillors and administrators qualify the rela-
tionship as good in general; others claim the relationship is not good at all. How-
ever, if we look in more detail, tensions and conflicts seem to be part and parcel 
of politico-administrative relations in the municipalities included in the research, 
and this substantiates observations cited in the introduction of this chapter. They 
concern the lack of information provided by administrators, and the fact that ad-
ministrators are not transparent about expenditures. They relate to the way ad-
ministrators administer funds allocated to projects, which on occasion results in 
accusations of embezzlement and decisions to suspend administrators. They are 
caused by the interference of councillors in the implementation of plans and pro-
jects, up to actions that aim to hinder the execution of council decisions. Most of 
these tensions and conflicts seem to be related to the fact that the different roles 
of councillors and administrators, such as they are laid down in formal rules, are 
either not performed properly or are not respected. This takes us to the role per-
ceptions of councillors and administrators. 
Perceptions of councillors and administrators 
The assumption is that the way councillors and administrators perceive their own 
role and the expectations and perceptions they have regarding each other’s be-
haviour can contribute to our understanding of the politico-administrative rela-
tionship in Tanzanian local government.  
 
The perceptions of councillors 
How do councillors view their own role in local government? Interviews and fo-
cus group discussions with councillors in the two local government authorities 
included in the research indicate that councillors view themselves as the ones 
who are the overseers of all council matters and responsible for the wellbeing of 
the council in general. They see themselves not only as the formal decision-
makers with respect to plans, projects, budgets and local regulations; they also 
consider themselves to be the supervisors of administrative staff and of the prop-
er implementation of the development activities agreed in the council. This atti-
tude was clearly shown by one councillor who participated in the focus group 
discussions when he stated the following: 
‘I am the chairperson of the social service committee; I represent the people and I am their 
voice and most important, I supervise the council administrative staff to ensure that they per-
form their duties according to the rules, laid down procedures and laws.’ (Mafuru et al. 2015: 
29) 
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Councillors expect administrators to respect the formal authority of the council-
lors and to be committed and loyal to them. They also expect administrators to be 
competent, i.e., to have the ability to achieve the desired results and to execute 
the policy directives, and the capacity to find creative solutions to implement the 
policy decisions in the best possible way within the given constraints. However 
some of the councillors are of the opinion that the actual behaviour of administra-
tors does not meet these expectations. 
In the first place councillors denounce the fact that administrators do not in-
volve them in certain decisions and are not transparent about the implementation 
of council programs. Councillors in both municipalities complained that the ad-
ministrators responsible for the councillors’ capacity-building programs never 
involved them in the preparation and implementation of the programs. Council-
lors find it inadmissible that administrators are sometimes doing things at the 
ward level without involving them. The failure to provide timely information 
related to council meetings and the diversion of funds allocated to projects men-
tioned above is perceived as behaviour that does not fit the role of the administra-
tor. The discontent about the behaviour of administrators on the part of the coun-
cillors goes hand in hand with a lack of trust in their intentions. To some degree, 
councillors view administrators as unethical and as individuals who lack patriot-
ism, concentrate on their own benefits, and do not pursue the interest of the 
community. Councillors think administrators cannot be trusted to manage funds 
in a proper way. 
Secondly, some of the councillors have the perception that the administrators 
are incompetent; they have a low opinion of the administrators’ technical exper-
tise and denounce their ability to implement the programs and projects decided 
by the council. 
The research in the two local government authorities does not allow for gen-
eral statements regarding whether the lack of trust in administrators is justified. 
However, if councillors are not content with the performance of local administra-
tors and distrust their intentions and competence, it does provide one explanation 
for the fact that councillors tend to interfere with the activities of administrators 
as described in Section 4. Moreover, the combination of discontent and distrust 
from time to time is likely to result in outright conflicts between the council and 
the administration. Reference can be made to what happened in Mvomero Dis-
trict:  
In Mvomero District the Council informed the Regional Commissioner that they were not 
satisfied with the performance of the Executive Director and other administrators. It lament-
ed that the administrators had grossly violated its directives. As a remedy, the Council rec-
ommended the immediate removal of the weak bureaucrats from the council. The Council 
demanded the former Council Chief Accountant, who had been transferred to another LGA, 
to be brought back and provide an explanation on the embezzlement of funds. Furthermore, 
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the full Council had decided to suspend the Executive Director for the misappropriation of 
funds allocated for development projects and the failure to supervise these projects. In the 
same vein, stern measures befell on the Council Planning Officer and two accountants on the 
same allegation. (Mafuru et al. 2015:35) 
 
The perceptions of administrators 
How do administrators view their own role in local government? Administrators 
consider themselves professional experts responsible for the development of pro-
posals for the council and their subsequent implementation, which is in line with 
legislative expectations concerning local government. In their view they are not 
only responsible for the technical aspects of proposals, but must also see to it that 
council decisions do not violate the procedures and guidelines laid down in legis-
lation and central government policies. Moreover, they consider themselves re-
sponsible for the implementation of the strategic goals of the council (Mafuru et 
al. 2015: 33).  
In line with the way administrators perceive their own role, they expect coun-
cillors to seriously consider the technical advice given by administrators, respect 
their proposals, and to be knowledgeable enough to understand and appreciate 
the proposals they put forward. Once approved, councillors should be committed 
to the agenda of the council and refrain from actions that may hinder its imple-
mentation. Moreover, they expect councillors to follow the procedures and codes 
concerning communication between councillors and administrators, which in-
clude the rule that all contact must be channelled through the head of administra-
tion, the Executive Director. Councillors should not involve themselves with di-
rect supervision of the activities of administrators, as shown in the words of one 
administrator: 
‘Just imagine, me being a specialist in finance, do I need a councillor to supervise me in or-
der to work?’ (Mafuru et al. 2015: 43) 
According to administrators councillors do not behave as expected. They ignore 
the technical advice of administrators when it suits them and frequently interfere 
in the daily activities of administrators. Councillors try to speed up the imple-
mentation of projects for their wards or, the other way around, seek to hinder the 
implementation of decisions that affect their wards: administrators consider them 
to step out of bounds and not respect their roles in the local arena.  
Administrators show a deep distrust concerning the motives of councillors. 
They are seen as driven by individual political interests and by personal gains 
rather than by the interest of the community as a whole or by the goals laid down 
in strategic plans. In the words of administrators: 
‘Whenever we give councillors technical advice, they accept it to the extent it promotes them 
politically… if in their view it doesn’t, they just see it as nothing and reject it.’ ‘They are 
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self-interested individuals who only prepare themselves for the coming election. They fight 
for the allowances paid in the council committees.’ (Mafuru et al. 2015: 34) 
Administrators also perceive councillors to lack adequate knowledge of technical 
issues. However, it should be noted that these observations are directly related to 
the level of education of councillors. Administrators in Mvomero District, where 
the majority of councillors are only educated to a primary level, found that most 
of the councillors have inadequate knowledge to make decisions regarding, for 
instance, the approval of the council budget.  
‘Despite the councillors being individuals with great roles, their low education qualification 
is a problem. Maybe it is high time the education qualification be among the criteria for any-
one who aspires to be a representative of the people, rather than, being able to read and 
write.’ (Mafuru et al. 2015: 37) 
Contrary to this, administrators in Kinondoni Municipality expressed their appre-
ciation of the capacity of the present council, where the majority hold first and 
second degrees and are retired staff of the public and private sector. Nevertheless, 
they still had ‘bad feelings, for no matter how good councillors are, their driving 
motive is very often to achieve political interests’ (Mafuru et al. 2015: 41). 
It was mentioned earlier that some councillors think they could do a better job 
running their own wards without the assistance of administrators. In the same 
way there are administrators who think local government would be better off 
without councillors. A number of administrators voiced this opinion:  
‘I still buy the idea of Nyerere in the 1970s where he preferred to have no councillors in lo-
cal government. Frankly speaking, councillors do not do anything that staff cannot do.’ 
‘I work with established rules and regulations […] and there is the watch dog of the govern-
ment, the national audit office […] so, all in all, I don’t buy the idea of working with or hav-
ing councillors in the local government.’ 
‘The Ward executive officers and Village executive officers are enough. We don’t need 
councillors.’(Mafuru et al. 2015: 43-44) 
Other administrators, who accept or appreciate the presence of councillors in lo-
cal government, plead for a strict separation of roles. In their opinion councillors 
should primarily deal with party issues and leave the staff to manage the council 
without disturbing them. Still, others appreciate the fact that councillors can play 
a positive role in the implementation of policies and in solving local problems, 
but stress the need for the training of councillors so that they are aware of the 
procedures to be followed and will not hamper the decision-making process (Ma-
furu et al. 2015: 43-44). 
Conclusions and reflection 
This chapter set out to describe and analyse politico-administrative relations in 
Tanzanian local government using three ideal types provided in the literature: the 
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classical, the village and the adversarial model. The findings we obtained from 
the fieldwork show that the relationship between councillors and administrators 
does not simply fit into one of these ideal types.  
There is no doubt that elements of the classical model are present. Up to a cer-
tain point councillors and administrators play their separate roles, the former 
concentrating on decision-making in respect to policies, plans and budgets, and 
the latter concentrating on preparing proposals and executing council decisions. 
However, the conditions for a fruitful classical relationship seem to be only par-
tially fulfilled. Administrators do not always provide the necessary information, 
which hinders councillors when it comes to decision-making regarding policies 
and programs and exercising supervision over their implementation. Councillors 
on the other hand are not always equipped to properly estimate the value of the 
proposals and advice of administrators, which they have also been known to ig-
nore due to what administrators consider individual political motives. Neverthe-
less, in general terms the legitimacy of councillors as decision-makers is not 
called into question, although some administrators think local government would 
be better off without them.  
Furthermore, it is clear that the practice of politico-administrative relations in 
Tanzanian local government only partially fits the classical model. Councillors 
frequently engage in activities beyond their role as decision-makers and adminis-
trators do not confine themselves merely to the execution of council decisions. 
Sometimes the relationship takes on characteristics of the village model, showing 
genuine cooperation between equals. This is the case when councillors and ad-
ministrators sit together to develop budget proposals, or when councillors lend 
active support to the implementation of projects in their ward by mobilising peo-
ple to make contributions. The research suggests that this type of cooperation 
occurs when administrators and councillors are aware they depend on each other 
to make good decisions and carry out successful projects and when they mutually 
respect each other.  
More than by genuine cooperation, however, the practice of local government 
seems to be characterised by mutual intervention. It is easy to see that elements 
of the adversarial model are present. Administrators act as players in the political 
game in their own right, trying to influence decision-making in the council and 
disagree with council decisions concerning the allocation of budgets. In the 
course of ensuring that their priorities are given maximum consideration during 
the implementation process, councillors frequently interfere with the executive 
actions of the administrators. It is exactly this invasion of the primary domain of 
the other – administrators playing politics, councillors interfering in administra-
tion, in a struggle to control the allocation of resources - that causes conflicts be-
tween the two parties.  
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So, what is our final conclusion with regard to the nature of politico-
administrative relations in Tanzanian local government based on the empirical 
evidence we gathered from the field? We do not have a straightforward answer 
here. None of the three ideal types suggested in the literature was perfectly ob-
served in the actual practice of local politico-administrative relations. This, then, 
leads us to position the Tanzanian LGAs’ politico-administrative relations 
somewhere between the three models in the triangle presented in Section 2. Our 
research does provide a basis for some other observations.  
In the two local governments involved in the research, we found there is little 
or no trust present between councillors and administrators. The lack of trust re-
lates partly to the perceived competence of the other but more so to their per-
ceived intentions. Administrators believe the actions of councillors are motivated 
by individual political interests, the promises they made to their constituencies, 
and personal gains; councillors suspect administrators use their position, skills 
and knowledge in order to accrue personal wealth and not for the development of 
the community. It is this structural lack of mutual trust that seems to be responsi-
ble firstly for the flaws in the way councillors and administrators fulfil their pri-
mary functions of political decision-makers and administrators and secondly for 
the interference of councillors in administration and of administrators in politics.  
The findings in the two local governments involved in the research may not be 
representative of Tanzanian local government as a whole. But where relations 
between councillors and administrators are tense a lack of trust is likely to play a 
role. Our research suggests that education can contribute to the improvement of 
politico-administrative relations in local government. The training of councillors 
in legal and policy matters can help to create a level playing field in which politi-
cians and administrators can interact on the basis of comparable knowledge and 
expertise. However, it may be even more important to educate both councillors 
and administrators about the respective roles in local government attributed to 
them by the legal and administrative system. A thorough awareness of their own 
role can help them to avoid overstepping their competences and intervening in 
the domain of the other, and a thorough awareness of the role of the other can 
contribute to understand and accept his behaviour. This way, education can help 
to build trust and respect between politicians and administrators, which seems 
paramount for the improvement of their mutual relations and, ultimately, for the 
performance of local government authorities.  
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Case 1  Tears of a ward representative 
Case 
Mrs. Eliza Mtemi1 represents one of the 22 wards of the urban Ilala Municipal 
Council in the Dar es Salaam Region. Mrs. Mtemi was an education officer and 
has served in districts in several regions of Tanzania. At the end of her career she 
became head of the department of education of Kinondoni Municipality. Now 
she is retired. She was one of the first women to be elected in Ilala Municipal 
Council on her own merit. 
Mrs. Mtemi is very unhappy with the way development projects are planned 
and managed. As a ward councilor she is the chairperson of the Ward Develop-
ment Committee. This committee is responsible for developing projects that re-
late to the ward and ensuring their implementation. However, she feels she can-
not make decisions for her own ward because every plan has to be approved by 
the municipal council. Moreover, she has no authority over the council and ward 
officials and cannot influence the implementation of projects that are approved. 
The council has 22 wards and 120 streets, which it has failed to serve timely. She 
gives the example that, in the 2011/12 budget, the council approved six devel-
opment projects for her ward and none of them were done. Underscoring the 
worst of the situation, she remarks that three streets in her ward depend on health 
services from the neighbouring two localities while the bridge between them is in 
disrepair. During rain seasons there is no connection between the two sides, thus 
the three streets suffer with poor access to health services. She has reported the 
matter to the head of the works department each year for the past three years, but 
the bridge has not yet been repaired. In 2014 she tabled the issue to the council 
committee responsible for public works, but the municipal executive director 
could not explain why the work had not been executed despite the fact that the 
council approved her proposal again in the 2012/13 budget. He just stated that 
central government had been slow in releasing the funds and that he himself de-
cided which of the projects were the more urgent. Mrs. Mtemi suspects that some 
serious lobbying by councillors of other wards had been going on. Moreover, she 
                                                             
1. For the sake of anonymity the name of the councillor is made up. Her tears are genuine. 
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complains that council officials implement plans without involving ward- and 
street-level governments. For example, they decided to demolish two buildings in 
her ward without involving her. The people affected tried their best to resist the 
demolition and blamed her for not defending them. She feels caught in between. 
Citizens expect her to listen to their complaints, act as a mediator between them 
and the municipal government, and table their problems to ward and council offi-
cials for solutions but in practice it is almost impossible to influence the admin-
istration in its day-to-day operations. 
Mrs. Mtemi explains that the ward as an administrative unit supervises the 
collection of revenue as part of its jurisdiction. The ward- and street-level gov-
ernments raise complaints about the status of revenue collections in their wards. 
According to current financial regulations, the ward collects taxes if the levy 
does not exceed 50,000 Tsh. Taxes with levies of over 50,000 Tsh are collected 
by council administrative officials (trading officers) and not ward officials. The 
regulations do not allow the ward to use its own revenues: the ward must submit 
collected revenues to the district of which the district retains 75%. These reve-
nues are spent on the implementation of general council plans and not on the 
specific plans of the ward from which the revenues were obtained. She believes 
that revenue collection would be much more effective if the street level were to 
be involved. The leaders and officials working at the street level have lots of lo-
cal knowledge and can locate the possible areas for increasing the revenue base. 
Moreover, the population would be much more motivated to contribute and the 
ward officials to collect if everybody knew that the revenues would be spent for 
the benefit of the ward.  
Overall, the councillor is of the opinion that the municipal executive director 
has failed to implement the decisions of the full council. She wants more auton-
omy for the wards, both to decide on development plans and projects and to se-
cure their implementation. She also wants to be the decision maker regarding 
how to raise and spend revenues for the development of her own ward. 
 
Questions  
1. What is the picture that arises with respect to the actual roles of councillors 
and officials in policy development, decision-making, and policy implementa-
tion?  
2. With which of the three models discussed in this chapter does the actual divi-
sion of labour between councillors and officials correspond? 
3. How appropriate do you judge the roles played by councillors and officials?  
4. What is your position with respect to the councillor’s claim for more autonomy 
for the ward? 
 
 
 
Case 2  Land eviction in Mvomero 
Case 
The late 1990s were known as the era in which the national land use plan 
emerged in Tanzania. The plan dictates that each portion of land should be set for 
a specific use. In the plan, the district of Mvomero is never left untouched and 
the council has been obliged to review the way land is being utilised and check 
whether it is in line with the requirements of the land use plan initiative. Areas 
set as residential should be used for that purpose and likewise those set for agri-
cultural and pastoralist purposes are to be utilised in accordance with the aims for 
which they are judged suitable. This also applies to the reserved lands such as 
forests and conservation areas. In the reserved land and conservation areas, hu-
man activities such as the keeping of agriculture and livestock are either restrict-
ed or completely prohibited. The plan envisages that it is the duty of the district 
authorities to ensure that protected land is not encroached upon and remains free 
from any human activity. This includes the authority to forcefully evict those 
who occupy such reserved lands. Local governments must ensure that the evic-
tion orders are promptly issued and adequately implemented.  
The villages of Mela, Wami-Sokoine, and Kambala in Mvomero district have 
been at the centre stage of the eviction practice. Last year, the district security 
committee visited the villages and ordered the District Executive Director to re-
vise the district land use plan and submit a report regarding the matter. The DED 
referred the matter to the district land office, which developed the land use plan 
and its content. The report was then submitted to the district security committee. 
After receiving the district land use plan, the district security committee ordered 
the eviction of invaders present in the areas set aside as forest reserves. Sekilindi, 
the famous local politician in the area, explained that certain parts of Mela, 
Wami-Sokoine, and Kambala, which were normally used for agriculture and 
livestock keeping, had to be vacated as a consequence.  
The Mela village chairman pointed out that local leaders were not involved in 
planning the eviction and did not play any role in the local mobilization process. 
He stated that the news came as a surprise to them and that they could not imag-
ine what would happen to the local communities. Neither the district security 
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committee nor the council officials explained the significance of preserving the 
conservation land or the requirement of the communities to leave the areas in 
advance. The police field force unit simply appeared one day, which created a 
scene like a battlefield. The chairman of Wami-Sokoine village posed a question 
as to why such chaos, to the extent of putting the police force at the front line of 
the eviction practices, was needed. The local leader also questioned where the 
evicted people would go given the fact that they had been living in the so-called 
forest reserves for decades. 
The local politician at Mela alleged that the police had impounded about 385 
cows belonging to a member of the local community. During a follow-up, the 
community member found only 303 cows to be in police custody. Yet, it tran-
spired that a payment of 30,000 Tsh per impounded cow had to be made before 
their release. On top of that, the community member was required to officially 
declare that he and all members of his household would move out of the village, 
as the area for grazing had already been set aside for forest reserves. The Mela 
chairperson raised a number of questions. In the event of their eviction, where 
would the family go? Children have been registered in the village school, what 
would be their fate? Which came first, human beings or forest reserves? The 
chairman at Kambala village pointed out that the eviction order was land-
grabbing from its planning to implementation. It was the unilateral decision of 
the district security committee that controlled the practice.  
As it turned out, the quest to protect the conservation areas was agreed by 
both the council members of the security committee and district officials. How-
ever, they differed in their approaches. As opposed to the government officials, 
the politicians rejected the use of force to evict people from their homes. The 
councillors felt that the officials had overstepped their authority, and feared that 
the council would be held accountable for the excessive use of violence and for 
any damage caused. The official from the district secretariat, on the other hand, 
hinted that the land use plan did not need politicking. For any failure regarding 
its implementation as a central government directive, accountability would go 
directly to the government officials and not to the politicians. 
Questions 
1. What roles did the councillors, district officials, and village leaders play in 
this case? 
2. Based on the evidence presented, what is your opinion on the communication 
between councillors and village leaders and between councillors and district 
officials? 
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3. If it was decided that the use of violence was excessive, and that villagers 
should be compensated for damages to their property (i.e. the loss of cattle), 
who would have to be held responsible for the compensation? 
4. What would be the right way to plan and implement land evictions? What 
would be an appropriate role for district councillors, local leaders, and offi-
cials? 
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Village leadership and  
good governance in Tanzania 
Eliza Mwakasangula, George Igulu, Anosisye Kesale & Denis Kamugisha 
Introduction 
Good governance is important for the development of communities because it 
puts forward a set of principles necessary to realize social and economic devel-
opment. The concept of good governance, to be elaborated hereafter, serves as 
the starting-point of this chapter. One of the good governance principles is effec-
tive participation of the people in decision-making activities: the more the people 
are effectively involved in the matters that affect their lives, the better the gov-
ernance outcomes are expected to be. This chapter is about conditions that have 
to be fulfilled in order to realize high levels of citizen participation, and thus 
good governance, in Tanzanian villages.  
One of the possible conditions for good governance is leadership. It is as-
sumed that villages need good leadership: the kind of leadership that will effec-
tively influence the willingness of the people and the community at large to con-
tribute towards the decision-making and realization of common goals. Therefore, 
the question addressed is: what type of village leadership is required in order to 
secure good governance? Leadership has always carried a different meaning to 
different people. In this chapter the term leadership is taken to refer to the pattern 
of behaviour of the individual(s) holding political/administrative positions in the 
government through election or appointment (Mutahaba 2012). The essence of 
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leadership is the influence the leader has over followers or subordinates. Effec-
tive leaders are expected to have a constructive type of influence over their fol-
lowers or subordinates.  
The aim of this chapter is to show how the behaviour of village leaders influ-
ences villagers’ willingness to contribute to the realization of goals at the village 
level. To achieve this, the chapter starts by examining the concept of good gov-
ernance and its applicability in the village setup. It then continues to elaborate on 
the concept of leadership; leadership behaviour and its possible theoretical link to 
good governance is specifically discussed. The second part of the chapter exam-
ines the actual influence of the behaviour of leaders on community participation, 
drawing on experiences from four selected villages. It also discusses a number of 
conditions, (the leader’s education and experience and the culture in the village) 
that may enhance or diminish leadership effectiveness. 
The concept of good governance  
The concept of good governance is not new in the field of public administration 
(Kamugisha 2013). The idea of good governance gained more and more attention 
in Africa, particularly in the Sub Sahara Africa, during the last decade of the 20th 
century. According to Santiso (2001), the aim of the good governance model was 
to address the dismal and inefficient management of public affairs in Africa, in-
cluding the inadequate management of aid and the unfortunate government 
commitment in service delivery and endemic corruption, among others. Good 
governance was viewed as a key determinant of any government to bring about 
sustainable economic development (Santiso 2001; World Bank 1992). 
 
Definitions of good governance 
There is no single agreed-upon definition of good governance. Numerous schol-
ars have presented a list of definitions. Malunde (2008) views the phrase ‘good 
governance’ as a concept that calls for a system of public management that is 
open, transparent, responsive and accountable to the people or citizens. For Dunn 
(1986), the phrase embraces effective government institutions. Hyden (1992) 
sees the concept of good governance as ‘the conscious management of regime 
structures with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm.’ In a nut-
shell, he acknowledges the importance of institutions in managing public affairs. 
According to UNDP (2000) the phenomenon covers the processes, mechanisms 
and institutions in which citizen and civil group play a part. This definition car-
ries with it the interface between actors (i.e. state, private and citizen) involved in 
managing public affairs at different levels of government. 
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This chapter uses the UNDP conception as an operational definition, for it co-
vers aspects of process, mechanisms and institutions in the management of public 
concerns. The World Bank (1989) supports this notion. The World Bank finds 
good governance embedded in the governance process, which encompasses 
standards such as accountability, participation, rule of law, human and civil 
rights and transparence. Malunde (2008) and UNESCAP (cited in Mfaume 2011) 
give an account of eight features of good governance, namely: participation, rule 
of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity and inclu-
siveness and efficiency and effectiveness. In this chapter the focus is on one of 
these features: participation, in the sense of the contributions of the members of a 
community towards a common goal.  
 
Participation as a key component of good governance 
According to Cornwall (2008), participation has more than one meaning and 
form. Participation is concerned with how different people and groups in society 
are involved in the governance process. It shows the manner in which stakehold-
ers are effectively involved in the governance process (Musalem & Aziz 2011). 
The true concept of participation covers all decision-making avenues, particularly 
those that affect people, directly or indirectly, of all socio-economic and political 
circles. Farrington and Martin (2010) indicate that participation has to exist 
alongside the decentralization of decision-making at a grassroots level. Commu-
nity ownership develops through true participation. Kamugisha (2011) indicates 
that true participation can inculcate a sense of ownership. Grassroots participa-
tion in all matters goes a long way toward the building of a citizenship mentality 
(Gaventa & Valderrama 1999). The resulting sense of ownership increases citi-
zen awareness and the accountability of the public servants and administrative 
systems (Farrington & Martin 2010). This scenario is captured in the Tanzanian 
village setup indicated below.  
 
Good governance and the village setup in Tanzania  
In Tanzania, village governance is a part of the local governance structure. Local 
governance in Tanzania refers to three key items or levels as defined and distin-
guished in the Local Government Reform Agenda 1996 - 2000: first, it is about 
institutional empowerment through the creation of suitable systems and struc-
tures. Second, it is about the creation and enhancement of transparency and ac-
countability in the management of institutions. Finally, it is about increasing the 
influence of citizens and civil society organizations on public institutions (URT 
1996).  
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There are thirteen good governance principles guiding public services in Tan-
zania. These principles of good governance have been stipulated in the National 
Framework adopted in 1999, as indicated in Table 4.1. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Governance principles in Tanzania 
1 The Constitution ensures and adheres to the doctrine of separation of powers and political 
stability 
2 An efficient and effective legislature 
3 Security of persons and property 
4 Accountability, transparency and integrity in the management of public affairs 
5 Rule of law 
6 Electoral democracy 
7 Protection of human rights and freedom 
8 Efficiency in the delivery of services by public officials 
9 Participation of citizens in political, economic and social decision-making 
10 An informed and skilled society that is aware of and ready to legitimately defend its rights 
and freedoms and to hold its governors accountable 
11 Decentralization of government and the bringing of public services closer to the end user 
12 Empowerment of local councils and communities through devolution of powers and func-
tions, public participation and financial decentralization 
13 Promotion of gender equity and equality 
 
 
Some of the principles (such as numbers 2 and 3) involve desired outcomes of 
governance, whereas other principles (6 and 9 to 13) refer to essential attributes 
of the relationship between power holders and citizens. The common denomina-
tor of the latter is the notion of citizen participation and involvement. Connecting 
this notion with good leadership at the village level, one might say that good 
governance requires, first of all, that the village leadership develops and shapes 
exactly that notion in everyday village administration. Good leadership takes into 
account the principles of good governance and, most directly so, the principles 
that touch upon the relationship with citizens. It is from that perspective that, in 
the sections to come, the issue of leadership and good governance will be dis-
cussed. 
The concept of leadership  
Leadership is a term that is widely and commonly used among different commu-
nities. People talk about leaders and their leadership styles in day-to-day life. 
There are leaders who have been known for their good leadership, just as there 
are leaders who have been known for their bad leadership. Although the term is 
widely used, there is no one single agreed on definition of leadership. A literature 
review on the definition of leadership shows that the concept has been defined 
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either in terms of what the leader does, that is, the behaviour shown by the lead-
er, or in terms of what the leader has, that is, personal traits or in terms of the in-
fluence the leader has on followers (Yukl 1989; Bass 1990; Winston & Patterson 
2006). This chapter adopts the definition in terms of behaviour (Mutahaba 2012). 
This definition is adopted because it reflects the nature of village leadership. Vil-
lage leaders, namely the village chairperson and the village executive director, 
are elected and appointed respectively to hold leadership positions in the village 
government.  
The behaviour of the leader is very important in determining how followers 
react or respond to what leaders want them to do. Behaviour is a source of influ-
ence that the leader can use over followers. Leadership behaviour is all about the 
actions of the leader. These actions can be seen or observed when the leader per-
forms duties and interacts with followers. What can be observed from leaders 
includes behavioural traits such as the way the leader talks to followers, what the 
leader does, how the leader uses time, how the leader interacts with followers and 
how he or she makes followers act, to mention just a few. 
There are many different types of leadership behaviour that have so far been 
identified by different researchers (Yukl 2002 2012). In recent years the classifi-
cation of leadership behaviour into transformational and transactional behaviour 
has gained much popularity (Bass 1985; Yukl 2002). Transformational and trans-
actional leadership behaviours reflect two different behaviours that influence or 
appeal to their subordinates.  
 
Transactional leader behaviour is based on the exchange relationship between 
the leader and the subordinates (Kuhnert & Lewis 1989; Yukl 2002). In this ex-
change relationship, the leader offers subordinates what they want in return for 
compliance with what the leader wants (Yukl 2002). Transactional leadership 
behaviour can take on different forms: Contingent reward, active management by 
exception, and passive management by exception: 
i. Contingent reward: the leader set goals and performance standards and 
provides tangible or intangible rewards for the performance achieved  
ii. Active management by exception: the leader closely monitors performance 
of subordinates and takes corrective action as they arise  
iii. Management by exception-passive: the leader intervenes only when prob-
lems become serious.  
 
Transactional leadership behaviour is viewed as a top-down leadership style, 
primarily involving the directing and commanding of followers.  
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Transformational leadership behaviour, on the other hand, motivates subordi-
nates by making them aware of their importance in the organization. The trans-
formational leader achieves this by appealing to subordinates’ inner values and 
higher-order needs that make them committed to and enthusiastic toward organi-
zational performance (Yukl 2002). Dimensions of transformational behaviour are 
charisma, individual stimulation, and individual consideration.  
i. Charismatic leadership: the leader is a role model and inspires subordi-
nates through his/her vision, integrity, decisions, reputation and perfor-
mance 
ii. Intellectual stimulation: the leader challenges subordinates’ ways of think-
ing and doing things. He/she encourages subordinates to be innovative and 
visionary in addressing organizational problems and goals  
iii. Individualized consideration: the leader recognizes and pays personal at-
tention to the needs, aspirations, and potential of individual subordinates. 
He/she gives personal advice, coaching and opportunities to grow and de-
velop. 
 
There are many studies that explore the relationship between transformational 
leadership and different dimensions of leadership effectiveness (Nguni et al. 
2007; Judge & Piccolo 2004; Walumbwa et al. 2005; Avolio et al. 2004). The 
overall argument is that there is a positive relationship between transformational 
leadership and subordinates’ satisfaction with the leader, job satisfaction and or-
ganizational commitment. 
From the above explanation, one might deduce that transformational leader-
ship to a large extent coincides with leadership that conforms to the principles of 
good governance. It further allows for the assumption that transformational vil-
lage leadership will have a positive influence on the willingness of villagers to 
contribute towards the realization of village development projects. However, it 
could just be that in the context of Tanzanian villages transactional leadership or 
some combination of transformational and transactional leadership is the most 
effective. The empirical findings that are presented in the next sections will shed 
some light on this issue.  
Village leadership institutions in Tanzania 
The structure of the village government leadership in Tanzania is made up of a 
Village Chairperson (VC), a Village Executive Officer (VEO) and sub-
village/hamlet chairpersons who are also members of the village council. The 
village leaders perform numerous functions. The village chairperson is the top 
leader of institutions of governance in the village. S/he chairs village council and 
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assembly meetings. The Village Executive Officer (VEO) administratively as-
sists the chairperson both for planning and for executing approved policies 
(Njunwa 2005). The VC is obliged to promote the social welfare and economic 
wellbeing of the people by planning and coordinating activities. S/he must main-
tain peace, order and good governance within the village, encourage village resi-
dents to undertake and participate in communal enterprises, make bye-laws 
which are applicable within the village and give assistance and advice to the vil-
lagers in various legal and productive activities such as agriculture and forestry, 
among others (Mustafa 2008; Max 1991). 
The chairperson is elected from the village population by the villagers them-
selves and he/she must be a permanent citizen of the village, a member of a polit-
ical party and capable of reading and writing in Swahili. S/he assumes office 
with a tenure of not more than five years, and he/she may be re-elected to lead 
for another period of five years. S/he is accountable to villagers and is not direct-
ly employed by the district council. The villagers can overthrow the VC by cast-
ing a vote of no confidence.2  
The VEO is employed by the District council as a public servant and together 
with other functions he/she works as a secretary to the village council of which 
he/she is also a member. S/he performs all functions of the village council. S/he 
ensures the collection and proper utilization of village revenues, prepares and 
presents revenue and expenditure reports and participates in making village bye-
laws (Max 1991). 
Villagers elect hamlet chairpersons within their respective hamlets. They are 
members of a political party and permanent residents of a village. They become 
members of the village council due to their positions (Njunwa 2005; Mustafa 
2008). Some of the functions they perform include the mobilization of the resi-
dents for development activities such as the maintenance of general cleanliness in 
the area. They are also responsible for resolving disagreements or conflicts that 
may arise amongst the residents. Common problems that are dealt with are disa-
greements over inter-household lines, spouse misunderstandings, drunken resi-
dents who disturb the peace, as well as cases of theft and sexual abuse (Njunwa 
2005). However, cases that demand higher expertise are normally submitted to 
the respective Mtaa/Village government committees for further action. 
The hamlet (kitongoji) leader may appoint a committee of three persons from 
amongst the residents of the hamlet to advise him/her on issues relating to the 
hamlet. He or she may also appoint one of the residents to act as secretary. The 
                                                             
1. The elections of village leaders and sub-villages (vitongoji) as well as the sub-ward committees in 
urban areas (mitaa) are guided by clauses in the Local Government Authorities Acts No. 7 and 8 of 
1982. Section 30(4) of the Local Government Act (District Authorities) No.7 of 1982 empowers the 
Minister responsible for Regional Administration and Local Government (RALG) to issue regulations 
for elections of vitongoji and mitaa chairpersons as well as their respective committee members. 
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hamlet does not have any legislative or decision-making powers. It operates ra-
ther as a forum for mobilizing community participation and support than as an 
organ of administration (Mustafa 2008). 
Leadership experiences in four villages 
The Tanzanian legislation considers the participation of villagers to be an im-
portant element of good governance. Rules concerning local government deci-
sion-making are stipulated in amendments to the Local Government Act No. 7 of 
1982, especially in Act No. 6 of 1999. The role of village leadership as given 
above is thought to be imperative in enhancing effective participation of villag-
ers. Therefore it is worthwhile to take a close look at leadership practices at the 
village level and see to what extent local leaders do indeed promote citizens’ par-
ticipation and which factors influence the effectiveness of the leadership the local 
leaders exert. This section and the following provide a description and analysis of 
leadership practices of the village executive officers in four villages, based on a 
research by Mwakasangula et al. (2015). The leadership of village chairpersons 
will not be discussed. To qualify leadership practices, the concepts of transac-
tional and transformational leadership are applied.  
 
 
Table 4.2 Village features 
District Village No. of hamlets No. of Households Village government 
members 
Rungwe Kazi-A 2 254 20 
 Kazi-B 5 2322 25 
Babati Chemba-A 4 771 25 
 Chemba-B 4 849 25 
 
 
The case descriptions are derived from the findings of a study on leadership in 
four villages in Tanzania. The study was performed by staff members of the Pub-
lic Administration and Management faculty of Mzumbe University (Mwakasan-
gula et al. 2015). Data for that study were collected through observations and 
interviews. The villages studied3 are Kazi-A and Kazi-B in Rungwe district and 
Chemba-A and Chemba-B in Babati district. Table 4.2 presents some features of 
the villages.  
 
                                                             
2. The names of the four villages are fictional so as to conceal their true identity and ensure confidential-
ity. 
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Leadership behaviour and participation in the villages 
Kazi-A village 
The VEO at Kazi-A village was a young woman in her late twenties. Her ap-
proach to leadership was highly defensive. She did not call meetings regularly to 
involve the community in various issues. As one of the respondents pointed out,  
‘There is a problem of conducting meetings in this village. […] Our leader does not call 
meetings frequently as it is required by law. […] Very few people attend, that is why we fail 
to discuss and reach consensus on important matters of our village.’  
The VEO was blamed for not being open and transparent. She failed to share re-
ports on village income and expenditure. In the words of one community mem-
ber,  
‘Our leader is not cooperative; she does not want to share information with us. She doesn’t 
want to give us reports on how much we get from district council, how much we should con-
tribute as a village. She has never read to us the revenue and expenditure reports.’  
Her followers were not attending the general village meetings and they were un-
willing to contribute to the building of a school. It was typical, too, of the leader-
ship style of this VEO to intimidate the people into refraining from enquiring 
about village affairs. As one of the respondents put it,  
‘We do not know of the issues the VEO is dealing with. They are forcing us to participate in 
every development activity in this village, but when we ask them about the contributions of 
the (district or village) government for those activities we get no response. We are never told 
how much we get from the district as support for the development activities in our village. 
That is why we are not ready to support them on development issues.’  
The VEO herself believed that the community was not forthcoming and willing 
to participate in development activities. She said,  
‘Villagers are not participative at all, they will reject whatever you tell them, when you call 
for a meeting they do not attend and when the decision is made in those meeting they disa-
gree.’  
In order to implement various decisions and activities she employed militia 
(Mgambos) to enforce people to contribute funds and abide to decisions. This use 
of force made her quite unpopular in the village. The village accomplished very 
little in terms of development projects. 
The leadership behaviour of VEO of Kazi-A can be characterized as leaning 
towards a negative transactional approach, typified by the use of coercive power, 
lack of transparency and a poor relationship between the VEO and community. 
Community participation was poor.  
  
Kazi-B village 
The VEO of Kazi-B village was a male in his fifties. His level of education was 
to Standard Seven. He was an experienced administrator: he had worked in vari-
66 
 
 
ous villages as VEO. His approach to leadership was to use meetings. He called 
meetings regularly and used these meetings to discuss and plan various activities 
in the village. He also read out the reports of revenues and expenditures before 
the community. These reports were later printed and placed on noticeboards for 
the people to read for themselves. As one of the respondent put it,  
‘Every month our leader displays the revenue and expenditure of our village and he allows 
us to ask some questions (contrary to other villages). […] We don’t see why we shouldn’t 
support him.’  
He was effective at convincing and mobilizing the community towards different 
activities. For example, the VEO and the villagers reached a decision in the vil-
lage assembly to build a village office, a village market and a secondary school; 
all are constructions considered very useful for the development of the village. 
The community liked him and appreciated his leadership. As one of the respond-
ent pointed out,  
‘For sure we are lucky to have this leader. […] He knows our problems and our contribution, 
as he involves us in every stage of each project carried on by our village.’ 
The VEO’s leadership behaviour made him accomplish many things at the vil-
lage. The village had a good village office, a good secondary school, a warehouse 
to store crops and an open market. These facilities were all accomplished through 
the participation of the community in contributing funds and other resources.  
The leadership approach of this VEO can be qualified as transformational. 
The leader involved the community in decision-making and implementation. The 
leader was transparent in his day-to-day activities and invited questions and 
comments from the community. 
 
Chemba-A village 
The VEO of Chemba-A was a male in his forties. His education was to secondary 
school level and a certificate diploma in local government. The VEO was closely 
working with his village chairperson. He was well organized. He used a logbook 
to write down his schedule of activities and plans to be accomplished. He called 
the meetings as per the requirement of the law and read the reports on revenues 
and expenses to the community. He had a strong persuasive power and an ability 
to mobilize the community towards accomplishing various activities in the vil-
lage.  
The VEO’s leadership behaviour enabled him and his VC to get things done 
in the village. As one of the respondents put it,  
‘Before he came to our office it didn’t look like this, also we used to walk a long distance 
fetching drinking water, but now we have drinking water around us we are proud of him de-
spite of political challenges he is facing from the opposition party.’ 
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The leadership approach of the VEO can be qualified as something between 
transactional and transformational. 
 
Chemba-B village 
The VEO at Chemba-B village was also a male. His education was to primary 
school level. As a leader he was selective regarding in which decisions to involve 
the community. However he had a strong persuasive power that gave him an ad-
vantage in getting the community to implement various decisions and projects in 
the village. He regularly called meetings but only allowed limited issues to be 
discussed, as pointed out by this respondent,  
‘He calls meeting and we attend but don’t think we discuss all village issues. […] The good 
thing is that our village is doing better in development programs, thanks to our village leader 
because his ability is very high.’  
So the villagers were inspired by his leadership skills and his ability to execute 
development activities. His only weakness was his inability to publish reports on 
revenues and expenditures: one of the respondents remarked,  
‘We are missing important information here, we haven’t heard and see revenue expenditure 
for very long time. We know that it’s our right to know that because we contribute our mon-
ey.’  
Despite this weakness the VEO was considered strong and able to make the 
community participate in the identified village projects. The leadership approach 
of the VEO can be qualified as something between transactional and transforma-
tional. 
 
Factors contributing to leadership effectiveness in the four 
villages  
One of the important questions in analyses of the leaders’ behaviour is: what 
makes leaders effective, given a certain leadership style? Different answers can 
be provided in regard to this question. In the sections to come the influence of 
two factors that appeared to shape leadership effectiveness in the four villages are 
discussed. The first one is the educational background and professional experi-
ence of the leader. The second one is the culture of the villages. 
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Education, experience and leadership style 
 
Kazi-B village  
 
The VEO in Kazi-B village had many years of experience in leading people. He 
gained his experience as an administrator in different villages in Tanzania, per-
forming the same function as a village executive officer. He had worked in Iringa 
region and Mbeya region and in these regions he had moved from one village to 
another. He was 52 years old and, considering his long working experience, he 
must have faced ups and downs during his career. Even though he was only edu-
cated to Standard Seven, his ability to lead people was very high and his perfor-
mance was good. Through the mobilization of people and working in a team his 
village managed to build a village office and were doing very well in terms of 
contribution. For example, they contributed to building a secondary school and a 
warehouse for their agricultural products. 
While he faced many challenges in his administration, as a leader he managed 
to overcome them and move forward. For example, the councilor of the ward to 
which Kazi-B belongs came from the opposition party. It was once decided that 
every family should contribute 10,000 Tsh for the purpose of building a school. 
But this councilor from the opposition party refused to accept this amount and 
instead proposed 3,000 Tsh. This was a big challenge to the village leadership, 
but in meetings the VEO succeeded in convincing the people to contribute the 
required amount of 10,000 Tsh, explaining to them the importance of building 
the school. Another example that shows how experience matters in leadership is 
the decision-making regarding the levying of a market tax. The VEO wanted a 
market tax of 3,000 Tsh paid by every person who sold products at the market. 
Again the opposition party claimed this was far too high, but the VEO managed 
to influence the people in the village meetings that it was the right amount to be 
levied.  
 
Chemba-A village 
 
The VEO of Chemba-A village, a male in his forties, had enjoyed a secondary 
education and held a certificate in local government administration from one of 
the local government training institutions in the country. According to the villag-
ers’ descriptions, the performance of this leader was good. The people regarded 
this leader’s way of doing things as professional. His way of organizing work 
meant that his task was to mobilize people’s participation in development activi-
ties. Furthermore, the VEO in Chemba-A village was highly experienced in is-
sues concerning local government decision-making. He knew the inside culture 
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of the local administration and the challenges that emerged well. For example, 
the VEO was able to question the district executives about the transfer of funds 
to his village. He was able to negotiate the spending of the 20% fund that each 
village is supposed to get from the district after submitting revenue collections to 
the council. His level of education and long working experience as a VEO gave 
him the ability to negotiate with higher authorities regarding different matters 
emerging in the village. This leader was also able to mobilize people to construct 
a dam as a water reserve and convince people to have tap water from it. His ef-
fort provided many people in the village with tap water. This helped mothers 
who before that were travelling long distances in search of water. He also mobi-
lized people to build a well-ventilated village office, bought village chairs, built a 
school and managed to construct a road which was passable throughout the year.  
 
Chemba-B village 
 
The VEO of Chemba-B also had an ordinary secondary school education with 
long experience in managing local government authorities as a VEO. His behav-
iour and performance was generally good. Although this VEO did not attend any 
higher learning institution, he was very good at mobilizing people and encourag-
ing people to perform. This was evidenced by one of the villagers who said,  
‘We thank God for having good leaders in this village. Together the VEO and the village 
chairperson are doing a very good job. All these developments were possible because of their 
efforts, cooperation and ability to mobilize people to come and work together.’  
The VEO’s experience in leadership enabled him to solve many conflicts that 
occurred in his village. For example, there was an incident between farmers and 
pastoralists regarding land use. To resolve the issue, the VEO called a meeting of 
the quarreling parties, had them debate their differences and led them to reach 
consensus, thus resolving the conflict. Another example that highlighted his ex-
perience in leadership was a tax issue. Even though there were many political 
parties with differing opinions regarding taxes in his village, the VEO managed 
to reach consensus on the levy required and collect the necessary tax from his 
village. This made his people trust and respect him. 
 
Kazi-A village 
 
Thus the leadership in the three villages discussed so far was fairly effective. The 
data show that experience, more than education, greatly contributed to this effec-
tiveness. The leadership shown by the VEO in Kazi-A village was rather differ-
ent. The VEO from this village was a young lady in her twenties. This was her 
first time as VEO and she had no experience in leadership. Her level of education 
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was also low. At the time this research took place, she was alone in the office 
following the resignation of the village chairperson. Her lack of experience was 
apparent in the way she dealt with decision-making in the village. She lacked the 
competence to face challenges and solve conflicts in the village. She was unable 
to overcome the reluctance of her followers to perform development activities in 
the village. To make up for her lack of experience as a leader she used force. On 
top of that this village lacked a village chairperson. Together, these three factors 
(a low level of education, inexperience and the absence of village chairperson) go 
a long way in explaining the VEO’s poor performance. 
 
The influence of culture on leadership behaviour in the four villages 
The culture of the environment is a second factor that may explain leadership 
behaviour. Culture here is understood as the set of beliefs about how to behave 
that prevail in a society. The concept comprises the values and norms concerning 
the social behaviour of a particular community. Culture may influence the behav-
iour of leaders and their style of management; the way the leader behaves is like-
ly to be related to the culture of the society within which he/she is working. From 
the literature it is known, for instance, that patriarchal tendencies have framed 
women as inferior to men, particularly in areas of organization and management. 
As a result, few women compete for leadership positions at any level of an or-
ganization (Kamugisha & Ringo 2012).  
The influence of culture on leadership behaviour was relatively evident in Ka-
zi-A village. The village is located in the Mbeya region where women are con-
sidered weak and inferior compared to their male counterparts. The Kazi-A vil-
lage had a young female VEO, who was ethnically not from the Mbeya region. 
These circumstances put her in a situation where she could not work freely or 
with confidence. Being a woman, the VEO had an extra challenge to overcome 
the values of the villagers, most of whom did not believe in female leaders. Ex-
emplary for the patriarchal tendencies in the community was the following com-
ment made by one the respondents: ‘What can this little woman do for us?’ Seen 
from this angle, it is not surprising that the people in Kazi-A village distrusted 
their female leader. It can be argued that the VEO adopted the use of coercive 
power because of the unwillingness of the community to accept her as a leader. 
This leadership approach ensured at least the accomplishment of various council 
decisions and project implementations. 
The influence of culture was not clearly observed in the villages of Kazi-B, 
Chemba-A and Chemba-B. These communities were also patriarchal societies 
but the VEOs in these villages were all male and descended from the same ethnic 
society that they were leading. In other words, the villagers and the VEOs shared 
the same norms and values. The influence of culture may not be visible here, but 
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it is quite apparent nevertheless that this congruency of values made it relatively 
easy for these communities to identify themselves with their leaders (cf. Van 
Knippenberg & Hogg 2003).  
Conclusion 
The main purpose of this chapter was to explore the relationship between leader-
ship, good governance and factors that influence leadership behaviour. It was 
specifically intended to show how the behaviour of village leaders influenced 
community participation in development activities. The evidence available indi-
cates that the more leaders behave transformationally, the better the chances for 
community participation in development activities at the village level. Transfor-
mational leaders were identified as mentors and good listeners, supportive, hard-
working and transparent. The village chairpersons and village executive officers 
who were willing to listen to citizens’ demands and to provide support and help-
ing hand and who were hardworking and open about village affairs and village 
finances were the local leaders capable of winning the support of their citizens. 
Citizens then were willing and able to contribute funds and labor in the imple-
mentation of village projects.  
Only one leader in the previous cases totally conformed to the transformation-
al model, however. Two leaders showed a mix of transactional and transforma-
tional leadership behaviour. They did influence the people and succeeded in get-
ting the community to participate in development activities. They were transpar-
ent and effective. They did not, however, involve the people a great deal in delib-
eration, in making choices and in setting priorities. Still, they accomplished a 
great deal together with the village community. 
 One village leader showed negative transactional behaviour. Indicators such 
as the use of harsh language in communication with citizens and the use of force 
in making citizens participate in village projects characterized her leadership 
style. She applied the stick rather than the carrot, and, in coercing rather than 
convincing the community into cooperation, gained little support for and partici-
pation in village projects. Citizens were then reluctant to attend meetings and to 
contribute funds for project implementation. 
Leadership style is but one of many condition that influence leadership effec-
tiveness and citizens’ participation. This chapter examined the working of two 
other factors that possibly influence leadership effectiveness and subordinate par-
ticipation: the experience and education of the leader and the culture of the com-
munity in which the leader is functioning. A long experience in public affairs, far 
more than a good educational background, appeared to enhance the leader’s ef-
fectiveness, especially when persuading citizens to participate in decision-
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making and contribute towards implementation. The ‘culture’ factor had a mostly 
negative effect: a community with a more patriarchal culture tended to reject its 
female leader.  
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Case 1  Influence of leadership in  
development  
Case 
In the southern highlands of Tanzania there is a village located in the Mbeya re-
gion. For the purposes of this study, let’s call it Chemba. Most of the people in 
the village are indigenous and engage in farming. Mostly they farm for subsist-
ence while some extra agricultural products (especially bananas) are sold to gen-
erate an income. Other people engage in small farming businesses such as raising 
chickens. Most of the population earns less than $1.25 a day. Almost all people 
have completed primary school, and many, especially young people, have ac-
quired a secondary school education, as the introduction of ward secondary 
schools has greatly enhanced the level of education. In this region there is a 
number of districts and wards and there are many villages. 
In every village there is supposed to be a village chairperson (normally elected 
by villagers) and a village executive officer (appointed by the government). This 
case study is about the chairman of Chemba. This chairman was a farmer of 
about fifty years of age, and he was educated up to Standard Seven. He had two 
wives and several children, most of whom had completed Standard Seven. He 
had been in office for only five-year term. The community and the chairman are 
supposed to work together at the village level for the purpose of speeding up de-
velopment. However this does not always happen, as sometimes the people in the 
community disagree with the chairman regarding what should be done and how 
to do it. This can develop into a conflict between the chairman and the communi-
ty. If such a conflict is immanent, it takes strong leadership skills to make the 
development wheel continue to turn. 
In the village of Chemba, people were not performing in terms of bringing de-
velopment to the village. Whenever the leaders told them to contribute - to the 
building of a ward secondary school for example, or a village dispensary, or a 
village office - the villagers were unwilling and resisted. As a result the village 
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did not own any facilities. The local leader, the village chairman, did his best to 
create awareness of the importance of development activities but the responses 
were disappointing. Whenever he called a meeting to discuss different issues in 
the village the turnout was so small that it never met the quorum. Some villagers 
started complaining that the chairman failed to persuade his followers to attend 
meetings. As one of the village members said:  
‘There is a problem of conducting meetings in this village. […] Our leader does not call 
meetings as frequently as it is required by law. […] Very few people attend and that is why 
we fail to discuss and reach consensus on important matters of our village.’ 
The chairman complained:  
‘Villagers are not participative at all, they will reject whatever you tell them; when you call 
for meeting they do not attend and when the decision is made in a meeting they disagree.’  
Then he asked himself how he could help people to respond to what the commu-
nity needs and to participate in development activities in the village. 
In response to the people’s behaviour, the leader started to coerce them into 
cooperation. For example, he made them pay a contribution towards every pro-
ject the village wanted to begin. Sometimes he even used military force (mgam-
bo) to back up his demands. Sometimes he called community members into the 
ward office to ask them for statements as to why they didn’t contribute to devel-
opment activities, and sometimes he sent them to court. This made the life of 
these villagers miserable. One of the villagers pointed out:  
‘Our leaders are not cooperative; they always use force, they do not give us any room to dis-
cuss. They are always asking for us to contribute to village projects. What is the role of the 
government?’ Another villager added: ‘After all, the leaders do not share information with 
us. They do not want to give us reports on revenue and expenditure of this village, they nei-
ther give us information on how much we get from district council. This really disappointed 
us.’  
Questions 
1. Do you think there is good governance in the village? What elements of good 
governance are present and what elements are missing? 
2. In regarding the behaviour of the village leaders, what elements of transfor-
mational leadership can you discern? 
3. Regarding the behaviour of the village leaders, what elements of transactional 
leadership can you discern? 
4. Why do you think the village leaders play the role of leader in the way they 
do? What factors might prevent them from modifying their leadership style? 
5. Do you expect the leadership style adopted by the local leaders to achieve the 
effects they are looking for? Why? 
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6. From the point of view of promoting villager leadership and ensuring good 
governance, what modification of the displayed leadership behaviour would 
be desirable? 
 
  
Case 2  ‘We will support him to the  
last point’ 
Case 
Babati district is one of the districts that forms the Manyara region. The district 
has many villages but there is one village that is totally unique in terms of the 
execution of its development activities. The village has four vitongoji (sub-
villages) with a total of 771 households. The village has 2666 residents, out of 
whom 1,010 are members of the general assembly. The economic activities car-
ried out by the villagers are farming, owning small businesses, and keeping cat-
tle. The majority of its people have attained primary school and ordinal second-
ary school. On top of that the villagers generally have a high civic education, 
which makes them very aware of all issues pertaining to life in the village. For 
the past five years the village has been struggling to plan and implement different 
socio-economic projects to enhance or improve the delivery of services in the 
village. The village is headed by a village executive officer (VEO).  
The recent VEO had some unique attributes that helped him to work with the 
people of the community and to fulfil his duties and responsibilities most effec-
tively. He was very experienced: he worked in three or four villages before he 
was transferred to his current village. He had learned to work with different peo-
ple of various cultures. The VEO was a good communicator and was willing to 
listen to and talk with every person in the village regardless of age, gender and 
status. This quality helped him to entertain a good relationship with many villag-
ers. Lastly, the VEO was always available in the village. This availability ena-
bled him to provide support to the people whenever and wherever it was needed 
in both social and official matters of the village. 
Over the last two years the village wanted to implement a number of projects 
for the purpose of improving the economic development of its people. Yet re-
sources were limited, so the village had to select a few priority projects to be im-
plemented. The VEO called the village assembly and asked the meeting to 
choose the projects that were most important to them, projects that, if imple-
mented, would help to solve a problem they face. The villagers agreed to start 
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with a water project and decided to each contribute 10,000 Tsh to fund the con-
struction. The VEO worked very hard to organize the construction of the water 
project. He gained a lot of appreciation for his efforts. As one village member 
said:  
‘Before he came to our village it didn’t look like this at all. We used to walk a long distance 
for fetching drinking water, but now we have drinking water around us. We are proud of him 
that he is succeeding, despite political challenges he is facing from the opposition party.’ 
Every month until the building was completed, the VEO released reports on ex-
penditures and revenue of the project and on the progress of the building process. 
Villagers cherished the efforts of the VEO, as one villager remarked: 
‘He is very good leader, to us he is like a gift from God, and we will support him to the last 
point because everything he decides is in our interest and because he engages us by giving 
timely information so we know everything he does.’  
The VEO spoke in different public places where many people gathered in the 
village to discuss matters that were of interest to the villagers, such as markets 
and water taps. One community member commented:  
‘Our leader always is available to answer our questions, to support and share with us in so-
cial issues and government activities. He tries to show us that he is there for us and not oth-
erwise.’ 
Questions 
1. Do you think there is good governance in the village? What elements of good 
governance are present and what elements are missing? 
2. In regarding the behaviour of the village leaders, what elements of transfor-
mational leadership can you discern? 
3. In regarding the behaviour of the village leaders, what elements of transac-
tional leadership can you discern? 
4. From the point of view of promoting villager leadership and ensuring good 
governance, what modification of the displayed leadership behaviour would 
be desirable? 
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Institutionalized coproduction  
in the delivery of agricultural  
services: experiences from  
the cashew nut value chain in  
Southern Tanzania 
Gustav Kunkuta & Paul Amani 
Introduction: The cashew farmers’ riot 
Late in 2013 the cashew farmers in Southern Tanzania staged a daring riot that 
lasted for several days in protest of the delayed second payment for their cash-
ews. According to a senior local government officer in one of the affected dis-
tricts, the farmers had many grievances and a deep mistrust of the marketing of 
cashews, particularly regarding the way the cashews’ price is determined. During 
the riot the farmers smashed public assets including vehicles and offices of the 
ruling party. The bureaucrats involved in the cashew nut sector had to run and 
hide for their safety. Those who were captured were injured, the lives of their 
families threatened and their assets vandalized. The unrest resulted in several 
arrests by the police. The riot took a dramatic turn when the protestors resorted to 
arson. Several homes and other properties of ministers, members of parliament 
and senior politicians with residences in the cashew producing districts were 
burnt down to ashes.  
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As observed by Mfaume & Kunkuta (2015), by these acts the farmers did not 
only seek to ‘make a point’ to the government about their unhappiness with the 
arrangements governing the cashew market but also to punish the people the 
farmers considered not to have acted in a manner that protected the interest of the 
cashew producers. Some international news organisations (CNN and the BBC) 
indicated that the ‘war’ was so intense that the government had to deploy a huge 
police force including surveillance police helicopters from the de facto capital of 
Tanzania Dar es Salaam, located over 500km from the riot zone. This riot and the 
on-and-off skirmishes between the cashew farmers and authorities that had been 
experienced over a number of years (Citizen 2014) potentially signal the limita-
tions of the reform of the cashew nut sector. The reform introduced new institu-
tional arrangements, establishing what can be considered a system of coproduc-
tion aimed at improving the livelihood of the farmers.  
This chapter investigates whether the present institutional design of service 
delivery and production in the cashew nut sector in Southern Tanzania has im-
proved the livelihood of the farmers. Specifically, it examines how the actions of 
various actors, governmental and quasi-governmental, have affected the actual 
delivery of agricultural services and the incomes of the smallholder farmers, con-
sidered to be the primary beneficiaries of the reform. The contribution of the 
chapter lies in its attempt to investigate the reality of the performance of copro-
duction as an approach to organizing and improving service delivery using the 
case of the cashew nut value chain in Tanzania. The analysis uses documented 
experiences and also some existing empirical research in Tanzania’s cashew nut 
sector, including a research conducted by scholars of the School of Public Ad-
ministration and Management of Mzumbe University (Mfaume & Kunkuta 
2015).  
The chapter contains six sections. After this introduction, the second section 
presents a brief overview of the cashew nut sector in Tanzania. The third section 
describes the old system of organising the cashew nut sector, leading to the 
fourth section that examines the reforms introduced in the sector in Tanzania. 
This section explores the actors and the design of the sector following the re-
forms and finally introduces the concept of coproduction in relation to the organ-
isation of the sector in Tanzania. The fifth section discusses the reality of service 
delivery and coproduction in the cashew nut value chain in Southern Tanzania. 
This section the chapter investigates how the new institutionalisation of the sec-
tor and coproduction have affected the delivery of agricultural services and in-
comes of the smallholder farmers. The sixth section concludes the chapter, citing 
some policy implications to improve service delivery and coproduction in the 
cashew nut sector in Tanzania.  
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Brief overview of the cashew sector in Tanzania 
The cashew industry is an integral part of Tanzania’s agricultural sector, which 
employs more than 80% of the rural population (URT 2008). Cashew nuts are an 
important export crop, generating substantial foreign income for the country 
(UNIDO 2011: 11). Cashew farming is especially an important source of income 
and employment for smallholder and poor farmers in Southern Tanzania where 
Mtwara, Lindi and Ruvuma regions account for over 90% of Tanzania’s cashew 
production (CBT 2010). According to UNIDO (2011: 7) over 500,000 house-
holds in the districts of Mtwara, Lindi and Ruvuma engage in cashew farming. 
Over 85% of the plantations owners are smallholder farmers with around one 
hectare of land (UNIDO 2011: 13).  
The cashew production is therefore an important source of livelihood in 
Southern Tanzania. The sector is also a source of livelihood to a large number of 
farm labourers and local citizens involved in cottage processing and those em-
ployed in the retailing of the baked cashews. Over 80% of cashews exported 
from Tanzania are raw. It is estimated that if all cashews were processed in the 
country, over 750 million Tsh could flow to the rural communities in five years, 
which is roughly 3% of GDP (ANSAF 2012).  
The Tanzanian cashew sector has made significant improvement, surviving 
near-collapse in the 1980s (Mitchell 2004). The production has increased steadily 
since the 1990s and through the 2000s. 
 
 
Table 5.1 National cashews production statistics 2002 through 2012 in metric tons  
Year 2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2011/12 
Mt 92,154 77,507 73,040 77,446 92,573 158,000 
Source: CBT (2010); ANSAF, ACT & BEST-AC (2013); Rweyemamu (2004). 
 
 
While some people have argued that the ‘high prices for the raw cashews are the 
main reason for improved production’ (UNIDO 2011: 12), others (Fitzpatrick 
2012; Rweyemamu 2004) have attributed the increased production to market-
based reforms, leading to increased uptake of farming technology by the farmers 
and to the availability of loans and investments. It is therefore interesting to as-
sess the design of the cashew sector and, more precisely, the way the governmen-
tal actors provide services for the cashew farmers.  
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The corrupted old system of organizing the cashew sector 
The cashew industry in Tanzania in the 1960s through 1980s was characterized 
by a plethora of actors. Besides the farmers and the buyers, the Cashew nut Au-
thority, also known as the Cashew Marketing Board (TCMB),4 the local govern-
ment, the Primary Cooperative Societies and the Secondary or Regional Coop-
erative Unions played a role (Rweyemamu 2004). The National Cashew nut Au-
thority was responsible for the overall regulation of procurement and marketing 
of cashews. The National Cashew nut Authority enjoyed wider powers including 
ensuring the development and sustainability of the cashew industry, providing 
policy recommendations to the government and also controlling the marketing 
and export of cashews (UNIDO 2011). The Primary Cooperative Societies (PCS) 
were expected to procure and ensure the availability of farm inputs, such as ferti-
lizer, and financial services to the farmers. Alongside the Regional Cooperative 
Unions, the PCS actively participated in buying and selling the cashews to the 
National Cashew nut Authority.  
Many private buyers bought the cashews directly from the farmers, offering 
very low prices (CBT 2010). Like the National Cashew nut Authority, the private 
merchants exported the cashews oversees, mainly to India. Local governments 
were responsible for agricultural extension services and coordinated, monitored 
and supervised the distribution of farm inputs.  
Literature, for instance CBT (2008), indicates that this organisation of the 
cashew industry failed to safeguard the interests of the farmers: it functioned in-
efficiently at the expense of farmers. As Reyemamu (2004) noted, Tanzania’s 
cashew sector did not support the farmers, who experienced:  
‘Inefficient and untimely supply of inputs, (…) frequent (policy and regulation) changes in-
fluenced by political decisions, lack of technical package, lack of storage facilities, transport 
problems and competition with other crops such as maize for (investment) resources.’ (p. 15)  
Jaffee (1995) stated that a combination of problems led to the near collapse of the 
industry in the late 1980s. A key problem was the increasing financial difficulties 
of the Primary Cooperative Societies, the Regional Cooperative Unions and the 
Tanzania Cashew Marketing Board, which resulted in large quantities of unsold 
nuts at the farm or village level at the end of the buying season. The producer’s 
share of the export price fell to 25% in the 1986/87 season. Cashew processing 
                                                             
1. Its names have changed over time. Up to 1962, the procurement and marketing of cashews was carried 
out by private merchants acting as middlemen between producers and Indian buyers. In 1962 the 
Southern Region Cashew nut Board (SRCB) was set up and replaced in 1963 by the Southern Agricul-
tural Products Board that was renamed the National Agricultural Products Board (NAPB) in 1964; in 
1974 the Cashew nut Authority of Tanzania (CATA) took over the role of NAPB. In 1985, the Tanza-
nia Cashew nut Marketing Board (TCMB) was formed to replace CATA. In 1993, the functions of 
TCMB were taken over by the Cashew nut Board of Tanzania (CBT) (Topper et al. 1998, in Sijaona 
2002: 9). The CBT is re-established under Section 3(1) of Cashew Nuts Industry Act N0 18 of 2009. 
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factories were operating at a loss, and between 1985 and 1990 nine of the twelve 
factories closed. Local authorities contributed to the problems of the factories by 
preventing cashew shipments between factories, which would have facilitated 
processing (Fitzpatrick 2012; Rweyemaumu 2004). Fitzpatrick (2012) and 
Rweyemaumu (2004) further report that administrative and political bottlenecks 
obstructed and resisted the liberalisation of the cashew industry. For instance, in 
the 1991/92 season all private buyers and primary cooperative societies were re-
quired to sell the cashews to the Tanzania Cashew Marketing Board for export. 
This discouraged private buyers to engage in cashew buying, giving farmers lim-
ited options to sell their crops to other buyers (Jaffe 1995). While the Primary 
Cooperative Societies helped to collect and transport cashews to selling points, 
they appeared to be weak and barely capable of supporting farmers to procure the 
vital farm inputs. In particular, because of a lack of good financial management, 
they lacked creditworthiness with the local banks, rendering them incapable of 
paying the farmers a fair price for their products on time. Rweyemamu (2004) 
adds that local governments constrained the cashew industry by imposing high 
local levies, taking advantage of the resurgence of the cashew productivity in the 
early 1990s.  
A new system of organising the cashews sector and coproduction  
In the late 1980s the government reformed the cashew sector with the aim of re-
invigorating the sector, in order to address the obstacles that had made Tanzania 
trail behind other cashew-producing countries and to protect the interests of the 
framers. The most important change regarded the introduction of administrative 
arrangements governing the procurement and marketing of cashews. The reforms 
proclaimed an involvement of the private sector in buying the cashews for pro-
cessing and exporting purposes (UNIDO 2011). Via the reforms, the government 
attempted to define or redefine the roles of the various actors in the cashew value 
chain including the roles of the national authority, now addressed as the Cashew 
nut Board of Tanzania (CBT). The participation of the farmers shows elements of 
coproduction in the cashew sector. The description of actors and their roles in the 
current system of sector organization are presented next. The new design of the 
cashew value chain and the concept of coproduction are discussed thereafter. 
 
Actors in Tanzania’s cashew value chain 
The current Tanzania cashew value chain is characterized by many actors, far 
more than in the pre-reform system of organizing the cashew sector briefly de-
scribed above. As depicted in Figure 5.1, included are the producers, primary 
cooperative societies, warehouse operators, processors, vendors, and exporters 
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and also a plethora of service providers and governmental agencies are included. 
Their functions are summarised below.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 The cashew nut value chain in Tanzania 
 
Source: UNIDO (2011: 8), slightly modified and simplified by the authors.  
  
 
i. Producers and primary and secondary cooperatives  
Producers are the largest group of stakeholders in the cashew value chain. They 
include around 200,000 agricultural estate owners and over 700,000 smallholder 
farmers that own family cashew farms of less than two acres in size. They use 
both family and hired labour to plough, plant, weed, apply pesticides and harvest 
the cashews (Mfaume & Kunkuta 2015).  
Many farmers are organized into over 200 Primary Cooperative Societies 
(PCS). They are membership-based and include the Savings and Credit Coopera-
tive Societies (SACCOS) and the Agricultural Marketing Cooperative Societies 
(AMCOS) (CBT 2010; UNIDO 2011). Through SACCOS farmers can access the 
credit they need to buy farm inputs and to finance other farming activities. The 
AMCOS supplies farm inputs such as fertilisers, pesticides and gunny bags.  
The Primary Cooperative Societies collect and buy raw cashews from their 
member farmers and in turn sell them to buyers under the Warehouse Receipt 
System, discussed below. The PCS are members of specific Regional or Second-
ary Cooperative Unions. The Cooperative Unions assist the PCS to procure farm 
inputs required by their member farmers. They also support them in distributing 
farm inputs, securing credit finance for their member farmers, building cashew 
storage facilities close to the farms and organizing cashew marketing arrange-
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ments via the WRS (UNIDO 2011). In addition, they work with the Cashew nut 
Board of Tanzania in cashew market analyses and setting indicative prices for 
each selling season (Fitzpatrick 2012). 
 
ii. Warehouses, buyers, processors and vendors  
Warehouses and their operations are part of the recent policy move known as the 
Warehouse Receipt System (WRS), which was introduced in the cashews sector 
in 2007 in order to improve the storage and marketing of cashews in a manner 
that benefits the farmers.  
The cashew value chain is further characterized by small scale cashew pro-
cessing. This is done in cottages (manually) and in a few processing plants with a 
limited capacity. Only 9 out of the 25 plants were working during the 2010-12 
season (FAO 2012).  
Selling is done in two ways. There are numerous vendors selling roasted cash-
ews at the roadside, bus stops, and public gatherings, and in the streets and even 
to passengers in long distance buses. As described by UNIDO (2011), the cashew 
hawkers may operate individually or work for the middlemen who pay them an 
agreed fee for selling the cashews on their behalf. The vendors also include those 
selling baked cashews at supermarkets, which are a fairly recent addition to the 
cashew value chain in the country.  
 
iii. Exporters and service providers 
Besides selling on the Tanzanian market, the main trade is on the international 
market by exporters. Exporters may operate individually or represent offshore 
companies. They buy raw and processed cashews from warehouses during the 
auctioning season. The main destinations are Europe, the USA, the Middle East, 
Kenya and South Africa. India is an export destination for raw cashews. In India 
the raw cashews are processed and exported to other markets including the USA 
and Europe (FAO 2012).  
To manage this process a number of institutions are involved. An important 
actor is the Cashew nut Board of Tanzania, which provides marketing infor-
mation, regulates the production, marketing and export of the cashews, supervis-
es extension services, supports the distribution of farm inputs by local govern-
ments, works with agricultural research and training institutions to promote 
productivity of the cashews and advises the government on cashew sector policy. 
Other actors are input providers, transporters and financial institutions that pro-
vide credit to cooperative societies.  
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The value chain: the cashews’ procurement and marketing  
The most remarkable change in the reform of the cashew sector has been the in-
troduction of new rules governing the procurement and marketing of cashews 
that revolve around the Warehouse Receipt System (WRS) introduced by the 
Warehouse Receipt Act No. 10 of 2005 that came into effect in 2007. This sys-
tem aims to modernize the entire cashew value chain from production to trans-
portation, marketing, storage and export. The WRS is meant to enhance transpar-
ency in the marketing of cashews, encourage the production of quality cashews 
via the uptake of modern technology available in the sector, improve the quality 
of storage and cashew grading services and eventually enable the farmers to ob-
tain good prices for their raw cashews via the open auction strategy (CBT 2008).  
Under this system farmers sell all cashew nuts to Primary Cooperative Socie-
ties (PCS), hence eliminating the buyers and their middlemen who tended to di-
rectly go to villages and farms where they allegedly underpaid the farmers. The 
PCS make an advance payment of 60% of the indicative price to the farmers at 
their farm gates (UNIDO 2011). This is the first instalment of payment. The sec-
ond payment is made after the PCS have sold their cashews. Thereafter, the cash-
ew nuts are transported to designated or registered warehouses for storage. At the 
warehouses, the cashews are weighed and inspected to ascertain their quality.  
Based on the timetable announced by the CBT the cashews are sold to proces-
sors and exporters by auction. The highest bidder gets the cashews. The WRS is 
meant to ensure that all cashews are auctioned at designated warehouses where a 
minimum price per a kilo of raw cashews set by the CBT is applied. This pre-
sumably forces the buyers to pay ‘a good price’ for the cashews, which (so the 
government says) leads to better earnings for farmers (ANSAF 2013).  
Successful bidders make payments to a local bank that issues them a note of 
evidence of payment for cashews called the ‘cashews release warrant’, which 
provides a ‘green light’ for the buyer to collect cashews from the respective 
warehouses for local processing, retailing or exporting.  
The concept, principles and degrees of coproduction 
The key argument made in this part is that the design of the cashew value chain 
in Southern Tanzania is evocative of the concept of institutionalized coproduc-
tion, in particular because attempts have been made by the government to define, 
regulate, and coordinate the activities of governmental and nongovernmental ac-
tors in the cashew sector. 
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The concept of coproduction 
The debate regarding the concept and practice of coproduction can be traced in 
the literature and studies of urban public service management by American 
scholars in the 1970s through 1980s. Coproduction, as defined by Sharp (1980) 
in Loffler (2009: 3), is: 
‘The recognition that public services are the joint product of the activities of both citizens 
and government officials.’  
Whitaker (1980: 240) argues that public agents alone cannot bring about the de-
sired improvements in the delivery of public services:  
‘The individual served is a vital “co-producer” of any transformation that occurs. Rather than 
an agent presenting a “finished product” to the citizen, agent and citizen together produce the 
desired transformation.’  
Kiser & Percy (1980) argue that any effort to enhance the quality and quantity of 
public services must combine the contributions and/or resources of the ‘regular 
producers’, defined as professional or public agents, and those of ‘consumer pro-
ducers’, that is, the citizens. Based on the above two types of service ‘producers’, 
Brudney & England (1983) defined coproduction as:  
‘The critical mix of activities that service agents and citizens contribute to the provision of 
public services.’  
The regular producers provide professional services in the service process while 
the citizens (consumer producers) coproduce in various ways, including the mo-
bilising and articulating of demands for services (Josh & Moore 2004) and also 
via the provision of labour and other resources.  
While we agree with Loffler (2009) and the American authors referred to 
above who argue that the concept of coproduction is not new because many pub-
lic services receive some contributions from both the agents and the service us-
ers, it is important to note that the concept of coproduction does also imply that 
the service user should adopt roles traditionally performed by public servants, for 
instance in the provision of education, healthcare, community security, sanitation 
and environmental management services.  
Josh & Moore (2004) have added the term ‘institutionalized’ to the descrip-
tion of coproduction. This invokes the concept of institutionalized coproduction, 
defined as: 
‘The provision of public services (broadly defined, to include regulation) through a regular 
long term relationship between state agencies and organized groups of citizens, where both 
make substantial resource contributions.’ (p. 31)  
The idea of institutionalized coproduction adds the element of the regulation of 
relationships between the state agencies and organized groups in the delivery of 
public services. It does also imply the idea of the coordination of the activities of 
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the participants, described in literature as critical to improving the delivery of 
public services (Brudney & England 1983; Ostrom 1996; Whitaker 1980).  
To sum up, the concept of coproduction questions the division of labour be-
tween the regular producers and the consumer producers. What activities should 
be performed by each part to improve both the quality and quantity of public ser-
vices? What should be the balance of division of labour in a given service? These 
questions not only question the role of governmental and nongovernmental actors 
in any service area including the cashew value chain but also the outcome of the 
roles performed, particularly with regard to whether they bring the expected re-
sults to the primary beneficiaries: the citizens.  
 
Principles of coproduction 
Even if there is no consensus in the literature regarding the key elements of effec-
tive coproduction, some principles appear to be agreed upon (Boyle 2008; 
Needam 2009 in Loffler 2009: 5). First of all the service users are active partici-
pants rather than passive consumers. Secondly, there is a collaborative instead of 
a paternalistic relationship between the public agents and citizens. Thirdly, the 
organization of the services is aimed at the delivery of outcomes rather than the 
services themselves. A fourth element is that the community makes an input to 
the service delivery. This is related to the fifth element, that the community-
based delivery may supplant or supplement delivery by public agents. Finally, 
the sixth element is that of shared benefits: both actors benefit from the service. 
Moreover, Pollitt, Bouckaert & Loffler (2007) see coproduction as involving the 
following: co-designing, co-deciding and co-evaluation of service delivery be-
tween the regular and consumer producers.  
 
Degrees/forms of coproduction 
There are different degrees or forms of coproduction (Brudney & England 1983; 
Loffler 2009). Each social service will show a certain variation in the amount of 
coproduction. In a minimum form the coproduction requires a provision of in-
formation by the service provider. This information empowers clients to assess 
the quality of the services provided. Annual reports, benchmarks and consumer 
groups are examples that are based on the active provision of information. A sec-
ond layer of coproduction is that of actual involvement in decision-making by the 
clients. The clients have an institutionalized position in decision-making. Exam-
ples are the establishment of parents’ committees in schools or the power to elect 
members to the board of the service provider. In the same vein the clients might 
even be able to vote for strategic choices in order to influence the service provi-
sion. Thirdly, coproduction could even imply a delegation of government tasks to 
the clients within a regulatory framework and support by the government. In this 
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mode the governmental interference is limited to creating a framework that ena-
bles groups in society to take up the responsibility to organize the provision of 
the service themselves. As an example, members of a local community might 
found a school. It is likely that the government will interfere via setting some 
criteria (e.g. regarding the curricula) and providing certain (financial) support. 
 
Coproduction in the cashew sector 
The Tanzanian cashew value chain can be characterized by a number of key ser-
vices that together define the organization of the sector. First of all there is the 
task of regulating and developing the sector. Secondly there is the provision of 
credit to the farmers. Thirdly there is the provision of a variety of farm inputs. 
The fourth is the marketing of the cashews, including setting their price. Apply-
ing the concepts developed above, the design of the value chain shows that ele-
ments of coproduction provided by the services involved is shared by public ac-
tors such as the Cashew nut Board of Tanzania and local governments and pri-
vate producers organized in Primary Cooperative Societies, AMCOS and Coop-
erative Unions. While price setting is conceived as a public responsibility, pro-
ducers are involved to some extent as farmers can select their representatives in 
the Cashew nut Board of Tanzania. The provision of agricultural inputs and cred-
its has been left to Cooperative Societies and Unions, the boards of which are 
selected by the farmers. All the public actors, and the private Cooperative Socie-
ties and Unions are supposed to provide relevant and usable information to the 
cashew farmers so that they can effectively assess the quality of services provid-
ed and accordingly demand accountability of managers for their actions.  
Service delivery in the cashew nut value chain  
This section examines whether the new institutional arrangements for the deliv-
ery of services in the cashew sector in Southern Tanzania have resulted in im-
proved services and higher incomes for the farmers. The analysis examines the 
roles of respective actors and their outcomes in relation to the four key services 
mentioned above: the regulation and development of the sector, the provision of 
credit, the provision of agricultural inputs and the marketing of cashews.  
 
The regulation and development of the sector  
Tanzania’s Cashew nut Industry Act No. 18 of 2009 mandates the Cashew nut 
Board of Tanzania, which is the only cashew board in the world, to perform 
many functions that shape the policy environment in the cashew sector: regula-
tion and coordination of activities pertaining to farming, marketing, transporta-
tion, storage of cashews, regulation and control of the quality of cashews, collec-
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tion, refinement and transmission of information regarding the cashew industry 
and advice to the government on policy and strategies for the development of the 
industry. The government policy on the cashew sector is unequivocal: to develop 
the sector both in production and value in terms of processing and also protecting 
the interests of the producers. However, recent studies on the sector have doubted 
the ability of the CBT to effectively discharge its mandate (UNIDO 2011). A key 
observation emerging from these studies is that the CBT lacks the capacity to 
modernize the cashew industry in that it lacks the sophistication necessary to ef-
fectively represent and promote national and local interests in international fora 
dealing with cashews. This view is well captured by Fitzpatrick (2012: 27): 
 ‘Tanzania is an important cashew country and should be represented in a confident and as-
sertive manner which… the Board fails to do as an organisation. We also believe that the 
Cashew Board of Tanzania has not developed a market knowledge and understanding fitting 
of [sic] its role representing the Tanzanian sector abroad and promoting growth and devel-
opment at home. The Cashew Board of Tanzania is difficult to contact. Senior staff... do not 
display knowledge of the sector abroad or the market. Symptomatic of this malaise is the 
strategic plan of the Cashew Board of Tanzania. It is not connected to any reality in its de-
scription of the World market – estimates of the world crop and of world consumption are 
very inaccurate and can only be based on old data.’  
While the CBT may lack the capacity as alleged, studies (Mfaume & Kunkuta 
2015; Rukonge 2013) also refer to politicization and bureaucratic interference as 
part of the factors compromising the sector. Anecdotal evidence suggest that the 
regulatory role of the CBT is fraught by political pressures exerted by the local 
and national political and bureaucratic elite who tend to use the sector to advance 
their own political and economic interests rather promoting interests of the pro-
ducers. Fitzpatrick (2012: 22) observes that: 
‘Much of the regulation could be effective but it is so highly politicized as to render the insti-
tutions charged with [the] management of the sector unable to listen to the market but 
obliged to listen to short term political factors especially from local politicians.’  
The author seems to suggest that the CBT does not always act or decide inde-
pendently. Instead, its conduct and decisions are at times restricted to instructions 
from the central government and the local notables. In the latter case it is alleged 
that some public officials, including some at the ministerial level of government, 
engage in buying and exporting the cashews. Since some of them are also alleg-
edly hired by some big business cartels they are unlikely to promote or call for a 
high price for the crop. Instead they will likely seek to buy cheaply for they have 
an incentive to do so. Anecdotal evidence suggests they achieve this by influenc-
ing or lobbying the CBT to set a low indicative price for the crop. If confirmed, 
this behaviour undermines the coproduction principle requiring fair play in terms 
of shared benefits between the public agents and the citizens.  
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Many studies (Citizen 2014; NMB 2013; Pass Trust 2013) have indicated that the 
cashew farmers are frustrated because of the lack of information provided to 
them. As established by Mfaume & Kunkuta’s (2015) study, there is a huge in-
formation gap in the sector: the farmers are barely informed regarding how the 
CBT works or makes decisions. The sector is often mired in uncertainties about 
what to expect regarding the prices of the crop, precipitating conflict between the 
farmers and authorities (Fitzpatrick 2012). Though the cashew nut board publish-
es the indicative or minimum price for a kilo of raw cashews before the selling 
season starts, this information hardly reaches all farmers. The media used (web-
site and newspapers) are not widespread among the farmers. Machira (2014) 
concludes that the lack of adequate and clear information regarding the payments 
for and price of cashews is the main reason for the riots experienced in 2013 and 
early 2014 in Lindi district where over 14 houses of public officials were de-
stroyed by angry farmers. The NMB (2013) suggests that the CBT and local gov-
ernments need to provide regular updates in order to keep all actors in the value 
chain, including the farmers, properly informed. 
Two of the nine members of the CBT represent the cashew farmers. These 
representatives are directly appointed by the minister responsible for agriculture 
(URT 2009). Mfaume & Kunkuta’s (2015) study reports that there is no indica-
tion that these representatives visit the farmers regularly to hear their views or 
explain to them the board’s decisions. Even more striking is that these repre-
sentatives are not known by most of the farmers. These findings suggest a weak 
coproduction with respect to the regulation and development of the cashew sector 
because it is devoid of some fundamental prerequisites: the effective provision of 
information, citizen participation in the decision making process and the planning 
and delegation of some tasks to the consumer producers: the farmers. In such 
situations the farmers are unlikely to command or mobilize an organized influ-
ence on the actions of public officials affecting their interests. Moreover, since 
they are not adequately informed they can neither effectively demand the ac-
countability of the public agents in service delivery nor effectively demand the 
improvement of the quality of services in the sector.  
 
The provision of credit 
Farmers need credit to effectively invest in cashew production: purchasing farm-
ing equipment, procuring fertilizers and agrochemicals and meeting the labour 
cost. The main providers of credit finance are the National Microfinance Bank, 
the National Bank of Commerce and the Primary Cooperative Societies 
(SACCOS and AMCOS). The central government provides input subsidies of up 
to 50%. This funding does not go directly to the farmers, but to the Cashew nut 
Board of Tanzania to help PCS procure farm inputs, especially pesticides and 
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fungicides (UNIDO 2011). Some governmental bursaries approved by the Na-
tional Assembly go to local governments under the District Agricultural Devel-
opment Programme to facilitate agro extension services and the availability of 
improved seeds. Despite these, arrangements studies (NMB 2013; Pass Trust 
2013) indicate that a lack of access to credit finance is one of the factors con-
straining the smallholder farmers from engaging in and improving the production 
of cashews.  
The banks consider the farmers a high-risk category that lack acceptable loan 
security or collateral and hence can only extend credit to them via the SACCOS 
or AMCOS. Even when finance is made available to SACCOS and AMCOS (and 
the farmers) it may not be used in a manner that benefits the farmers. The diag-
nostic by UNIDO (2011) concluded that:  
‘Most farmers can only get credits through the cooperatives, which in many cases do not ex-
actly represent their interests. (…) Finance received is often inappropriately managed by the 
farmers, cooperatives and processors.’ 
Noteworthy is that some recent research (NMB 2013; Towo & Kimaro 2013) has 
claimed that the introduction of the Warehouse Receipt System has improve 
farmers’ access to credit, arguing that the farmers are able to present to the banks 
the papers indicating that their produce is deposited at the designated warehouses 
and use them as alternative collateral to obtain credit from the banks. Likewise, 
the SACCOS and AMCOS accept the cashews as security for the loans. Howev-
er, none of the studies has provided concrete evidence of increased access to 
credit finance by the farmers. Mfaume & Kunkuta’s (2015) study refers to many 
factors that limit the farmers’ access to credit in the cashews sector: fear of debt, 
high interest rates charged by both the banks, SACCOS and AMCOS and also 
distrust of the cooperative societies by the farmers, who may use their ‘igno-
rance’ of the conditions attached to the credit to make money.  
Empirical evidence (Mfaume & Kunkuta 2015; Fitzpatrick 2012) has shown 
very little coproduction in the provision of credit. Firstly, while the farmers are 
generally informed about where they can access the loans, they remain ill-
informed about the conditions, criteria and implications of the loans. As revealed 
by Mfaume & Kunkuta (2015), many farmers feel that financial institutions are 
not transparent enough regarding the conditions of the loans and therefore some 
farmers end up signing for the loans while they do not fully understand their 
terms of repayment. Secondly, no study has produced evidence suggesting that 
farmers do influence the conduct or decisions of the cooperatives in which they 
are members. To some degree the national level via the specific legal instrument 
(the Cooperative Societies Act 2003) determines the modus operandi of the 
SACCOS and AMCOS. It also regulates the auditing of their accounts.  
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Even though members elect the boards of these institutions, experiences from 
across the country show that most of these boards lack competent leadership. 
Board members and leaders are often elected based on who they are rather than 
on their abilities. The SACCOS and AMCOS are weak financially, often because 
they are poorly managed. The leaders do not necessarily serve the interests of the 
members as some of them are known to have routinely misused the credit finance 
secured from the banks (Fitzpatrick 2012). Because of the poor track record of 
their performance they often lack the credibility to secure further loans from the 
banks. This renders them unable to effectively make credit available to their 
member farmers.  
 
Provision of agro inputs  
The cashew farmers need access to adequate supplies of inputs, particularly im-
proved seeds, fertilizers, fumigation gear including spraying equipment and in-
secticides and fungicides to prevent and/or fight destructive pests and disease. 
The foregoing description of actors in the cashew value chain has referred to the 
role of local government to coordinate and PCS assisted by Cooperative Unions 
to procure and supply the inputs to their member farmers. A number of recent 
studies (Mfaume & Kunkuta 2015; UNIDO 2011; Rukonge 2013) have produced 
evidence suggesting that the inputs delivery system has continually failed to 
function in a timely manner such that the cashew farmers have continued to lack 
access to the right inputs at the right time. These studies stress that there contin-
ues to be a serious shortage of the key farm inputs and that whenever they are 
available they may not be the right type or the right amounts and when they are 
delivered late they are of no use. ANSAF (2013) argues that the lack of access to 
farm inputs is a far bigger problem and a more serious failure, putting the liveli-
hoods of the farmers at grave risk, than the reported high price of the inputs de-
spite the government subsidies. UNIDO’s (2011) study concluded that:  
‘Application of inputs, particularly pesticides, is insufficient affecting productivity substan-
tially. The existing credit institutions as well as cooperative societies do not provide suffi-
cient finance to farmers to be able to purchase sufficient inputs.’ (p. 12)  
In addition to the high cost of inputs and untimely deliveries, the farmers com-
plain of the poor quality of the agrochemicals supplied:  
‘Despite the fact that the Tanzanian Bureau of Standards approves importers and the prod-
ucts they propose to import.’ (Fitzpatrick 2012: viii) 
Documented evidence (Mfaume & Kunkuta 2015) suggests the key actors (local 
governments and PCS) have not addressed the historical failure of public agen-
cies to improve farmers’ access to the services they need to promote productivity. 
As stated above, Cooperative Unions and PCS are known to habitually experi-
ence financial difficulties and tend to lack creditworthiness and therefore the 
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banks do not give them substantial credit. As already stated, this may explain 
their inability to procure and deliver the necessary inputs to the farmers. This 
failure also compromises the quality of cashews. As observed by UNIDO (2011), 
the failure of the PCS to provide gunny bags forces the farmers to use old sacks 
and any other rugs they can find. This arguably leads to good cashews being 
downgraded and fetching a low price per kilo, translating into low earnings for 
the farmers.  
In each financial year, local government authorities (LGAs) publish infor-
mation on the distribution of farm inputs, indicating the types, amounts and cost 
of each agrochemical to be supplied. The farmers access this information directly 
from the local governments or from their PCS. As established by Mfaume & 
Kunkuta’s (2015) study, the problem is that very often the actual supplies do not 
match the published information. The deliveries are usually not of the amounts, 
quality and types promised.  
The prerogative of input supply is the preserve for PCS and LGAs. Indeed, the 
farmers do have a leeway of opting to procure the inputs from private suppliers, 
however they tend to be very expensive and therefore undercut or diminish their 
earnings. One plausible explanation for the persistent failure in the delivery of 
agro inputs in the sector is the lack of adequate coordination among the institu-
tions responsible for this task. Another weightier explanation is that the PCS, 
including their boards, are not necessarily there to serve the interests of their 
member farmers. Some studies (Rukonge 2013; UNIDO 2011) have suggested 
that often the leaders of these organisations are there to pursue their own inter-
ests. At times, the PCS lack the flexibility to serve their members because their 
actions are subject to the directives of the national government via the Coopera-
tive Societies Act (2003) that stipulates membership conditions, types and stand-
ards of services to be extended to the members. 
 
The marketing of cashews 
The Warehouse Receipt System designed for the marketing of the cashews in-
volves the Primary Cooperative Societies buying the raw cashews at the gates of 
their members’ farms where they make a first instalment of around 60% of the 
minimum price of a kilo of cashews. The second instalment is paid after the PSC 
sells the cashews via auction at designated warehouses. It is worth emphasizing 
that the regulation requires farmers to sell their cashews via their PCS, prompting 
a criticism that the prevailing single channel of selling denies the farmers a 
choice of buyers (NMB 2013; UNIDO 2011; Fitzpatrick 2012). The discussion 
has shown that, to ensure that the farmers get a fair price for their crop, the Cash-
ew nut Board of Tanzania sets an indicative or minimum price per kilo of raw 
cashews. The Warehouse Receipt System not only aimed to eliminate the mid-
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dlemen or private buyers who were known to have been paying a low price for 
the good quality cashews, but also to boost value through quality grading and 
storage of cashews at the warehouses.  
Nevertheless, the prevailing marketing system puts the farmers in the back-
ground. They cannot negotiate the price themselves. Furthermore, as mentioned 
earlier, their representation in the CBT appears to be weak. This contradicts the 
co-planning and co-decision-making principles of coproduction discussed in the 
previous section.  
In assessing the effectiveness of the marketing of cashews, several studies 
(ANSAF 2013; UNIDO 2011; Rukonge 2013) refer to the high cost involved in 
the marketing of cashews with serious repercussions for the earnings of the farm-
ers. These authors stress that the cost involved in the collection and transporta-
tion of cashews from the farm gates to AMCOS and further to warehouses un-
dercuts the payment due to farmers. Fitzpatrick (2012) argues that compared with 
their counterparts in Ghana, cashew farmers in Tanzania face high costs in terms 
of administrative charges claimed by their PCS. The authors further observe that 
these administrative charges are not experienced in other cashew-producing 
countries in Africa.  
Studies (ANSAF 2013; Mfaume & Kunkuta 2015) indicate that the farmers 
shoulder the ultimate cost faced by the PCS, buyers and exporters in the form of 
various charges and taxes. This translates into low earnings for the farmers be-
cause the buyers tend to decline to or (using various tactics including lobbying 
and the use of political patronage as anecdotal evidences suggest) avoid paying 
higher prices for the cashews during auctions, arguing they need to make up for 
the cost they face in the cashew procurement process, including the export tax 
reported to be second to none in Africa. According to Fitzpatrick (2012: 26):  
‘Export duty on in-shell cashews has increased from 3% to 10% and (since 2012) to 15% ad 
valorem or 160 Tsh/mt. Export duty on kernels is 1% with a 2 year exemption for new facto-
ries.’  
Additional analysis by the author is compelling. He observes that while a kilo of 
raw cashews is bought for less than $ 0.33 in Tanzania (pre-WRS prices), a kilo 
of processed cashews fetches more than $ 8 when sold in Manhattan, USA. The 
author complains that the offshore processing and selling earn millions of dollars 
for those involved, but do not translate into better pay for the cashew farmers.  
PCS, Cooperative Unions and buyers and/or exporters all take their share at 
the cost of the farmers. Often it is not clear what the exact justification for this 
cost is, since it refers to ‘administrative costs’ such as bank transfers and fees 
levied by the corporative unions for administrative expenses. Mfaume & Kunku-
ta (2015) reports that farmers are frustrated and feel used by those they allege to 
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be benefiting, first most and unfairly: CBT, PCS, CU, local governments and 
buyers and exporters.  
As stated above, this mind-set explains the recent farmers’ ‘war’ against what 
they consider to be an unjust cashew-marketing regime. Moreover, the marketing 
of cashews in Tanzania reflects a weak coproduction because the process is 
fraught by a lack of information. Fitzpatrick (2012: 26) is highly critical, saying:  
‘The cashew nut industry suffers from a lack of good quality information… There are no 
rigorously accurate estimates of crops… There are often conflicts between figures offered by 
the different sources. (…) [The] trade statistics and crop estimates contradict each other. (…) 
The cashew industry is typically driven by myth, rumor and adversarial relationships.’  
Machira (2014) has echoed the above misgiving, indicating that the cashew 
farmers have been receiving contradictory information regarding the price of the 
cashews, thus brewing unnecessary tensions in the sector.  
The foregone discussion has referred to the following experiences that argua-
bly compromise the quality of coproduction vis-à-vis improving service delivery 
and livelihood of the smallholder farmers. Firstly, the CBT usually publishes the 
indicative prices on its website and also in newspapers that barely reach the 
farmers, meaning that the farmers tend have very little information, rendering 
them incapable of questioning the conduct of the public agents. Secondly, the 
farmers are poorly represented in the decision-making process in the sector. This 
makes them unable to muster the clout necessary to influence the decisions and 
actions of public actors in their favour. Thirdly, There is no evidence to suggest 
that the PCS and those involved in the marketing of cashews are there to safe-
guard or represent the interests of the farmers. As already stated, often these in-
stitutions do not work independently as they are at times driven by local and na-
tional politics, vested interests of the local and national elite and government di-
rectives promulgated in specific legal instruments.  
Conclusion  
The actual institutional design of the Tanzanian cashew sector contains elements 
of coproduction. According to the reviewed literature, coproduction promises a 
high quality of public services through the active involvement of citizen-
consumers. The reform of the cashew nut value chain, involving the public regu-
lation of the market and the participation of farmers in the provision of services, 
was expected to ensure the availability of high quality services so that the farm-
ers would not relapse into poor farming methods and would get better prices for 
their product. For the system of coproduction to work effectively, it must meet a 
number of requirements. The regular service providers need to provide quality 
information that is timely, accurate and usable so that the farmers can objectively 
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assess the quality of services delivered to them, in order to be in the position to 
demand the accountability of public providers and be informed about the availa-
bility of services. The involvement of the farmers in decision-making is vital. 
This ensures the adoption of policies that improve the position of the farmers. 
Primary Cooperative Societies are expected to safeguard the interests their mem-
ber farmers, for instance by ensuring farmers’ access to the right inputs as and 
when required and at a fair price, paying the farmers a fair price for their cashews 
and also by effecting the second payment as agreed and without undue delay. The 
government via the Cashew nut Board of Tanzania should demonstrate a com-
mitment to the reduction of transaction costs for farmers. This may involve re-
viewing, reducing and even abolishing some of the administrative fees. Financial 
institutions should deliver favourable financial services in a manner that supports 
the development of the cashew industry and benefits the farmers, for example by 
providing credit to the creditworthy AMCOS, which should in turn extend credit 
to their member farmers without charging exorbitant interest rates. 
Based on the analysis provided in this chapter, the question as to whether 
there is coproduction in the cashew nut value chain. The answer is yes, but it is 
very rudimentary in that it is yet to sufficiently meet most of the basic criteria for 
effective coproduction to be claimed. The actual influence of the farmers is rather 
limited. The public providers (CBT and local government), alongside the provid-
ers representing the farmers (the PCS and Cooperative Unions), seem to be fail-
ing in their responsibility of ensuring the effective delivery of agricultural ser-
vices required by the farmers. Information is not always available and when 
available it is of poor quality. Institutions give the farmers a certain influence, for 
example because members are elected. But in practice these members do not 
function as the representatives for the clients of the service provision. Moreover, 
the strong influence of the government in the organizational design of the service 
provision via the specific legal instruments hampers true self-provision. The or-
ganizations that seem to be based on ‘self-provision’ (like AMCOS and 
SACCOS) lack the means and formal competences to effectively discharge their 
mandates. For, as far as these organisations are examples of institutionalized 
coproduction, they at times appear to rely on the approval of the central govern-
ment and to be under the influence of local and national vested interest groups. 
Overall, the mismatch between the design of the coproduction of agricultural ser-
vices and the actual involvement of the clients might be the actual source of the 
expressed dissatisfaction of the farmers as accounted in the introduction.  
The good news is that there is a scope for optimism. As reported by UNIDO 
(2011), the aforementioned high cost of cashews marketing administration of 35 
to 43% of the total value of the farmers’ produce has dropped to less than 20% 
since the 2011/2012 selling season. Moreover, the above limitations notwith-
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standing, studies (Machira 2014; Mfaume & Kunkuta 2015; Towo & Kimaro 
2013) have generally accepted that the introduction of the Warehouse Receipt 
System has to some degree positively impacted the prices offered to the farmers 
for their cashews. Evidence compiled by these suggest that the WRS has seen the 
farmers earn up to 1,200 Tsh per kilo of raw cashews ($ 0.75) compared to only 
250 Tsh per kilo of cashews ($ 0.15) before the introduction of the WRS. 
UNIDO (2011: 13) argues that:  
‘Going back to the system where private buyers send their agents into the plantations is not 
an option, due to the lower prices farmers would then get.’ 
The value addition associated with the WRS regarding the quality storage and 
grading of cashews provided, as well as the indication of an improved uptake of 
technology among the farmers in that some of them are able to access credit fi-
nance via the WRS, are positive aspects that need to be recognized and promot-
ed. Even better results could be achieved if the farmers become part of the deci-
sion-making process, engaging in co-planning and co-evaluation of service de-
livery results alongside the public providers. The overall conclusion of this chap-
ter is that while the system of coproduction functions as it does, it has not led to 
an improved delivery of agro services but there are some signs that the farmers’ 
earnings are improving.  
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Case 1  The pitfall of coproduction in  
LGAs: local cashew nut processing  
by women in Kitama ward 
Case 
 
The local cashew nut processing group 
Jiendeleze women’s group is among many women’s groups in Kitama ward 
formed on voluntary bases in 2010. Like many other women and youth groups in 
Tanzania, it was formed with the ambition to engage in income generating activi-
ties. The Jiendeleze group was formed in response to and heed of government 
calls to empower youth and women in order to realize objectives and outcomes 
specified in the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty - 
MKUKUTA II. Among the strategies in MKUKUTA II is the economic empow-
erment of special groups such as women, young people and the disabled so that 
they can eradicate poverty. Jiendeleze women’s group is comprised of 12 women 
between the ages of 20 and 35. Two members have attained secondary education 
(Form IV), the rest have primary education level (Standard Seven). The group 
has elected its chairperson, secretary and treasury. The group is situated about 7 
km from the council and district headquarters. 
Due to a problem with operating capital and low level of economic awareness, 
the group remained idle until 2012 when it decided to mobilize small capital that 
they could use to process (roast) cashew nuts. As the tension between farmers 
and government regarding the price and time of payment was rising, the decision 
of the group to start processing cashew nuts was partly a response to the regional 
and district leaders’ campaign to calm farmers’ rebellions. A few weeks before, 
farmers and a group of youths caused a road block on all major roads leading to 
Tandahimba district headquarters, burning and destroying government property 
and also burning shops and guesthouses in Tandahimba town. Police retaliated 
by using firearms and teargas. The conflict was caused by the unsatisfactory ex-
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planations and conflicting answers from the district leadership, Tandahimba pri-
mary cooperative society, and the Cooperative Union (TANECU) regarding the 
delay of second and third instalments of payment for cashew nuts by the latter 
two organizations.  
Despite the decision and ambition of Jiendeleze group to start processing 
cashew nuts as a project that could generate income for group members, they 
faced the challenge of raising initial capital that could be used to buy raw cashew 
nuts and processing utensils. Eventually, the group members decided that each 
member should contribute 5,000 Tsh as seed money that would form an initial 
capital and they would continue to raise more capital from other sources. With 
60,000 Tsh in their hand, they decided to approach their ward councillor for addi-
tional support for capital. The councillor advised them to present their proposal 
to the council and explained to them that every year the council set aside a per-
centage of funds from the council’s annual budget to support youth and women’s 
economic and poverty alleviation initiatives. As support for the group initiative, 
the councillor wrote a recommendation letter to the council director.  
 
Meeting the council registry clerk 
The chairman and secretary of the group travelled to the council offices to pre-
sent their proposal for financial and other support. At the reception, they were 
instructed to submit their letter and proposal for marking and filing. The coun-
cil’s registry clerk told them that their letter was received and they should follow 
up after one week for their reply. A week later, they travelled back to council 
office to get their reply. Again, they were told that they should be happy because 
officers were working on their proposal and therefore they should follow up 
again after another week. The clerk hinted that the process could go much faster 
if they knew a senior officer in person so that he/she could more closely follow 
up their matter. Unfortunately, no one among them was lucky to know any senior 
officers in person. They decided to go back to their councillor to seek his inter-
vention to help solve the predicament. The councillor promised them that he 
would deal with the issue. A week later, the councillor phoned the group chair-
person and told her that he had followed up their proposal and that they should 
go to the council office and meet with the community development officer 
(CDO) to have their matter handled.  
 
Meeting the community development officer 
The group chairperson and the secretary travelled to the council offices where 
they met the community development officer. The officer told them that their 
proposal was received and scrutinized and that the council had agreed to register 
their group as one of the income-generating initiatives that was in line to receive 
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the council’s financial and material support. The CDO told them to be patient as 
they were preparing an official letter informing them on the decision and that 
they could collect the letter at the council registry office after three days. After 
three days, the group chairperson travelled to the council office and collected the 
official letter. The group met in one of the group members’ houses to read the 
letter. Part of the letter was informing them thus:  
‘Please understand that your proposal has been approved, but because the council has many 
development priorities this year, the council will be un able to give a supporting hand in this 
financial year. That means your group request will be included as one of the top priorities in 
the next financial year. Please make close follow up so that the government’s ambition of al-
leviating poverty through small and medium income generating initiatives as specified in the 
national strategy for growth and reduction of poverty - MKUKUTA IIS is realized. In the 
meantime your group is further advised to look for possibilities of securing credit facility 
from financial institutions.’ 
 
Financial institution frustrations 
As the council had already decided and informed the Jiendeleze group about the 
impossibility of financially supporting the group to undertake their proposed in-
come generating initiatives up to the opening of the cashew nut harvesting and 
marketing season in October, the group was still looking for alternative way of 
securing capital so that they could start implementing their proposed project. 
Disappointed by the council’s decision, they decided to follow the advice of the 
council and approached the National Microfinance Bank (NMB) for a credit fa-
cility. The group leadership and the bank loan officers had a brief discussion. The 
bank officers advised the group to submit a written proposal detailing their busi-
ness plan, management structure and the CVs of group leaders. Under guidance 
and assistance from a retired teacher, the group managed to prepare the proposal 
and in three days’ time a proposal to the tune of 1,000,000 Tsh was presented to 
the bank for funding consideration. The loan officer told the group that the bank 
could be in a position to review their proposal within three working days and 
therefore they could come back for the bank’s decision then. After three days, the 
group chairperson and the secretary returned to the bank to follow up their pro-
posal. The loan officer informed the group that their proposal was good and was 
provisionally approved. He said that the final approval could be made after the 
group met the additional condition of either submitting a title deed of a property 
or submitting a certificate of property registered by MKURABITA.5 An alterna-
tive condition was for the group to submit an official guarantee and commitment 
letter from the district council director. The group was unable to meet either of 
the two requirements of the bank and they could not get the loan. 
                                                             
1. MKURABITA is a property registration and formalization institution established by the government 
to assist poor citizens with simple procedures to register and formalize their properties. 
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The initiative and support by a Member of Parliament (MP) 
It was already December, and marketing seasons approached their end. The 
group decided to approach their constituent member of parliament to present 
their proposal and request additional working capital.6 The MP and Jiendeleze 
group discussed the matter and finally the MP agreed to extend non-conditional 
financial support of 100,000 Tsh to the group to enable them start their cashew-
roasting project. The MP promised to connect the group to SIDO7 for more fi-
nancial and training opportunities. A week later, the group received an invitation 
along with other women’s and youth groups to attend three days’ training orga-
nized by SIDO that was intended to teach groups entrepreneurship skills and the 
technological skills of processing cashew nuts. The training graduation was fol-
lowed by a ceremony in which the group was given 100,000 Tsh by SIDO as 
grant.  
 
Start of the cashew nut processing project 
By mid-December, the Jiendeleze group was able to secure 200,000 Tsh in addi-
tion to their initial 60,000 Tsh. With an initial working capital of 240,000 Tsh the 
group was able to buy a simple and SIDO-made cashew nut roaster and two bags 
(185 kg) of raw cashew nuts from farmers for 1,200 Tsh per kilo. The group 
spent 222,000 Tsh. The other 20,000 Tsh was used to buy other necessary uten-
sils for the work. 
After buying two bags of raw cashew nuts, the group set up a simple plant (ki-
jiwe) at one of the member’s family homes. Every member was responsible for 
collecting and bringing in firewood, coming ready to work and engage in de-
shelling (kubangua). They met daily after farming hours (around 3pm) and 
worked until sunset.  
In the first batch, they managed to get 46 kg of kernels (roasted nuts). The 
cashew kernels were sold to buyers from Dar es Salaam who set up their trading 
station at the guesthouse they rented for that purpose in Tandahimba town. They 
sold the 46 kg for 7,000 Tsh per kilo and managed to make 322,000 Tsh. After 
paying for the transportation costs of the boda boda (motorbike used for com-
mercial purpose) and the local sales fees collected by the council’s clerk of 200 
Tsh per kilo of sold kernels, the group was able to make a gross profit of 100,000 
Tsh. 
                                                             
2. In Tanzania, it is a common practice for people to approach their constituency member of parliament 
and request financial support, and in most cases MPs feel obliged to extend support. 
3. SIDO (Small Industry Development Organization) is a government organization established for the 
purposes of promoting the development of small industries in the country. It has offices in all regions 
and the key activities it undertake include imparting simple technology, capacity-building and support 
and offering small grants to small industrial initiatives. 
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The group negotiated with their buyer who agreed to give them an advance 
payment of 500,000 Tsh on the condition that they sell to him all they were going 
to process for the same price of 7,000 Tsh. They then had adequate capital to buy 
more raw cashew nuts from farmers. The group increased the number of roasting 
stations (kijiwe) from the initial two to three. The division of work was such that 
four group members were observed and managed one roasting station. The group 
also agreed to increase working time and decided to start work much earlier 
(around 1pm). The speed of the group in roasting the agreed amount would be 
the determining factor for going home early. With a total of 800,000 Tsh they 
managed to buy 660kg from farmers. 
They roasted and managed to get 149 kg of kernel. This brought in 1,043,000 
Tsh. The third round of processing and roasting was close to the end of the sea-
son and competition among buyers was already higher. The selling price was al-
ready increased to 8,500 Tsh per kilo and they sold 234 kg which gave them 
1,989,000 Tsh. One day the commercial officer from the council visited the sell-
ing centre and demanded that everyone selling kernels showed their business li-
cense from the council and their taxpayer’s registration certificate (TIN) from the 
Tanzania Revenue Authorities (TRA). No one among the people who came to 
sell their kernels had a business license or TIN. Commotion began and sellers 
organized themselves, flanked by a group of youths, and marched to the district 
commissioner’s (DC) office to air their grievances. Their claims were centred on 
the fact that they were farmers and poor people who had decided to engage in 
economic activities for the purpose of gaining legal and legitimate income. The 
youth claimed that the council authority was forcing them to revert to criminal 
behaviour. The DC promised to take the matter to higher authorities. 
The group continued with their cashew processing business and by the end of 
the season (February) the group brought the selling station more than 8 harvests. 
The group was motivated and happy with how they had progressed with their 
business, and by the time they closed the processing season they were able to 
collect a gross income of 5,271,000 Tsh.  
From the income the group received, the group agreed that they should first 
set aside 500,000 Tsh as initial working capital for the collection and processing 
of cashew nuts in the next season. The remaining sum was shared equally among 
group members after paying for some items such as the wage of the young boys 
who were assisting them in de-shelling and collecting firewood. Every group 
member earned 320,000 Tsh in cash. 
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Questions  
1. Who are the key actors in this case? What is the role they are expected to 
play? 
2. What do you think is the cause of the women’s group’s problems? 
3. What elements of co-production do you recognize? To what extent is there 
co-production?  
4. If you were requested to advise the government, what would you recom-
mend? How could the governmental system (including the cooperative socie-
ty) support these initiatives?  
 
  
Case 2  Cashew farming inputs in Southern  
Tanzania: a statement from a farmer 
Case  
‘When you people who are not farmers of cashew nuts hear about cashew nut development 
you think the government brings it. You are cheating yourselves; but you can be excused, for 
the misconception, since you are not engaged in this business. You need to have very hard 
skin to remain a cashew farmer. If you are not patient you will likely quit the farming, or cut 
all cashew trees down, clear the area and grow other crops such as sesame, and maize in-
stead.’  
This is a blunt assessment by a farmer in Tandahimba district in Mtwara region, 
Southern Tanzania (2013) who was responding to a question posed to the farmers 
to describe what being in the cashew farming business meant.  
 
Why did the farmer say so?  
The farmer went on to describe the experiences he had with the supply of cashew 
farming inputs as follows:  
‘During the sales of cashew nut at the Agricultural Marketing Cooperative Societies 
(AMCOS), I indicated the type and amount of inputs I required for the next farming season. 
Some amount of money was deducted from my cashew sale and retained by AMCOS as an 
initial deposit for my order of the inputs. Thankfully they gave me a receipt for the deduc-
tion. The AMCOS stayed with my money until the beginning of the new season when they 
notified me to come over to their offices to collect the consignment of farming inputs. Now 
here is when the problem started. I was required to add some more money for what was ex-
plained by the officers in charge as the price rise, over and above the price previously agreed 
during selling of our cashew nuts.  
Another problem and even more frustrating was that instead of being supplied with the 
kind and amount of the inputs we ordered we were at times forced to accept and collect a dif-
ferent type of input. For example, I wanted sulphur dust but I was literally forced to accept 
and collect Thiovit and Karate watery spray. But I am used to sulphur dust because it brings 
better results and it is easy to use in our dust spray machines and more importantly you can 
use it in our district where we face an acute shortage of water. The question is why should 
someone force me to accept something I did not choose or agree to pay for? If you look criti-
cally, you will find that the products the suppliers bring to the AMCOS have a low demand 
in their stores. I believe they are also comparatively sold cheaply in the private shop outlets 
while AMCOS sell to us the same products at a higher price. This is unfair. Surprisingly, our 
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council (local government authority) is there standing still while watching all these things 
happen; our AMCOS leaders attend the planning meetings convened by local government; 
they know that some of these products (cashew farming inputs) are ineffective in our envi-
ronment, yet they accept them and force us to accept them too.’ 
 
The shady forces regarding the supply of cashew nut inputs: the role of the 
cashew nut Development Trust Fund 
To better understand the dynamics regarding the supply of cashew nut farming 
inputs, a visit was made to a respective local government to hear the officers’ 
take on the above subject. In what was a rare admission of mismanagement by a 
public official, a member of staff working in the district cashew nut coordination 
office was critical of the council (local government), saying that the role of the 
Cashew nut Development Trust Fund (CDTF) was questionable. The behaviour 
of those responsible for making decisions on the use of this fund was causing a 
lot of auditing queries to the council from the Controller and Auditor General 
(CAG). For example, in the 2012 audit report the CAG questioned the expendi-
ture of 286,882,600 Tsh that was reportedly used by the council to purchase sul-
phur dust for cashew farmers in the district. The CAG insisted that the existing 
law required the council to receive the funds and use them to develop the produc-
tion of the cashew nut crop. When the CAG was later told that the council did not 
receive the funds from Cashew nut Board of Tanzania (CBT and/or CDTF) as 
expected, he was surprised and questioned why the money had not been provid-
ed. Even when he inspected the amount of agro inputs the council should have 
receive from CDTF compared with the actual amount the council distributed to 
the farmers he saw a lot of variations, which made him sceptical and worried that 
the council may have been engaged in corrupt business. Last year (2012) the var-
iation was up to 45%; this is inconceivable. The end result of this behaviour is 
the council loses credibility for the farmers and citizens at large. Further, these 
events precipitate conflict, feuds and clashes between the cashew farmers and 
government authorities.  
Questions 
1. Who are the key actors in this case? What is the role they are expected to 
play?  
2. Which elements of co-production do you recognize?  
3. To which extent is there co-production?  
4. Why would the farmer say that he was ‘forced’ to accept the wrong inputs?  
5. If you would have to assess the effectiveness of the design, what are the pit-
falls and how would you advise the government to avoid these pitfalls?  
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